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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE STAFF STUDY
EVOLUTION OF THE CENTRAL ORGANS OF THE
CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, 1921-1958
(Reference Title: Polo V-58)

Office of Current Intelligence

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SECRETOCI No. 5108/58
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OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
Reference Title: POLO V-58**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE STAFF STUDY**Evolution of the Central Organs of the
Chinese Communist Party, 1921-1958

This study is a working paper, reflecting information received through 1 October 1958. It is directed primarily to the structure of power in Communist China, but necessarily concerns itself as well with alignments among key figures in that structure and with the policies pursued by those figures. There are five charts which attempt to reconstruct central party organs in the periods 1921-27, 1928-44, and 1945-56; three additional charts set forth the composition of party organs from 1956 to date; and a ninth chart represents conjectured lines of primary responsibility among key figures in the current structure of power. The chart or set of charts for each period is followed by a commentary. The paper has drawn heavily, particularly for material on the careers of party leaders prior to 1950, on the work of the China/SEA Branch of the Division of Biographical Information of the Department of State; and has drawn in lesser bulk on the work of American scholars

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and on studies prepared by the
U. S. Consulate General at Hong Kong

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Chart 1

SECRETARY GENERAL

	First Congress	1921
	Second Congress	1922
	Third Congress	1923
	1924	
	Fourth Congress	1925
	1926	
	Fifth Congress	April 1927
	"Reorganization"	July 1927
	"Emergency"	August 1927
	"Emergency Conference"	

Retained in CCF

Chen Tu-hsiu
Chang Kuo-tao
Li Ta
Chou Fu-hai
Chen Kung-po
Shih Tsun-tung
Sun Yuan-lu
Li Sun
Li Han-chun
Tsai Ho-sheng
Li Ta-chao
Lo I-nung
Peng Shu-shih
MAG TSE-TUNG
CHOU EN-LAI
Chu Chiu-pai
Jen Pi-shih
Li Li-san
Li Wei-han
LIU SHAO-CHI
Su Chao-cheng
Tan Ping-shan
Chang Tai-lei
Chin Pang-hsien
Peng Pai
Hsiang Chung-fa

[illegible]

Chen Tu-hsiu
Li Wei-han
Tsay Ho-sheng
Chu Chiu-pai
Chang Kuo-tao
Tan Ping-shan
Su Chiao-cheng
Li Li-san
CHOU EN-LAI
Chang Tai-lei
Chin Pang-hsien
Peng Pai
?Hsiang Chung-fa
?LIU SHAO-CHI

	Remained in	CCP
?	?	
	Remained in	CCP
?		
	Remained in	CCP
?	Expelled, 11/27	
?	Died, c. '29	
	?	
?	?	
?	?	
?	Killed, 12/27	
	Remained in CC	
	Remained in CCP	
	?	
	?	

ORGANIZATION	Chang Kuo-tao		?	Possibly retained Labor Dept.				
	MAO TSE-TUNG							Remained on Central Committee
	?Jen Pi-shih						?	? ? ?

PROPAGANDA	Li Ta		Left CCP, c. 1927					
	Tsai Ho-sheng						Remained in CCP	
	Peng Shu-shih						? Remained in CCP	

PEASANT	MAO TSE-TUNG Chu Chiu-pai	?	Remained on Central Committee
---------	------------------------------	---	-------------------------------

LABOR	?Chang Kuo-tao	?	?	?	Remained on Central Committee						
	?Hsiang Ying				?	?	?	?	?	Remained in CCP	
	?Li Li-san									?	

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SECRETFounding of the CCP, July 1921

The first congress, held in Shanghai, formally established the Chinese Communist party (CCP) on 1 July 1921. There were about 12 delegates, including Mao Tse-tung and Tung Pi-wu of the current (1958) CCP politburo. A Marxist intellectual, Chen Tu-hsiu, who did not attend the congress, was elected Secretary General of the CCP. The congress also set up what was in effect a central committee, although it was not so designated until 1922. The listing of the central committee on Chart I, for July 1921, is as stated by Mao Tse-tung in an interview many years later; the first three members are fairly well confirmed, but the remaining six are uncertain. The congress reportedly established at least two central departments--an organization department under Chang Kuo-tao, and a propaganda department under Li Ta; a third, a labor department under Chang Kuo-tao, may have been set up at the same time.

Second CCP Congress, May-July 1922

The second congress, held in Shanghai, expressed the CCP's aim, in accordance with Lenin's precepts, of attaching itself to the Chinese nationalist movement. Describing the Kuomintang (KMT) as the only "revolutionary party" in China, the congress called for a conference with the KMT and "revolutionary socialists" with a view to forming a "united front." Admitting that the CCP was striving for a Communist society, the congress described the CCP's immediate task as that of leading the workers "to support a democratic revolution and forge a democratic united front..." Shortly thereafter, the Comintern proposed to the CCP that it cooperate with the KMT by forming a bloc inside that party rather than alongside it. Although this view was opposed by several CCP leaders, including Secretary General Chen Tu-hsiu, the August plenum of the CCP central committee apparently adopted the Comintern's plan.

The second congress apparently did not make any major changes in the CCP's central organs.

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Third Congress, June 1923

The third congress, held in Canton, expressed the CCP's ambivalent attitude toward the KMT. The congress observed that the KMT "should be the central force of the national revolution and should assume its leadership" but "unfortunately" relied on foreign backing and lacked widespread popular support; further, that the CCP hoped that the KMT would correct these failings; and finally, that the CCP saw its own "special task" as that of carrying out organizational and propaganda work among the workers and peasants. Subsequently, several CCP leaders, including Mao Tse-tung, were elected to the KMT equivalent of a central committee, and Chou En-lai became director of the political department of the Whampoa Military Academy headed by Chiang Kai-shek.

The third congress reaffirmed Chen Tu-hsiu as the CCP's Secretary General.

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Fourth Congress, January 1925

The fourth congress, held in Shanghai, was significant chiefly in that it indicated the CCP's increasing distrust of its ally, the KMT. This was expressed both in the manifesto issued just before the congress and by Mao Tse-tung's fall from favor. Mao was dropped from the central committee, after having earlier--by his own account--been dismissed as director of the organization department. Mao has said that he was removed from the inner circle and sent to his native Hunan because he was regarded as "too close to the KMT."

The action against Mao was apparently the only major personnel action taken or ratified by the congress. Hsiang Ying may have taken over the labor department at about this time.

Fifth Congress, April-May 1927

The fifth congress, held in Hankow, met two weeks after Chiang Kai-shek's break with the CCP. Chiang a year earlier had arranged to bar CCP members from key posts in KMT organs, but the Comintern had directed the CCP late in 1926 to continue to cooperate with the KMT. In March 1927, the CCP had helped to make possible the occupation of Shanghai by Chiang Kai-shek's forces, and early in April 1927 CCP Secretary General Chen Tu-hsiu declared the party's favor for continuing the collaboration. A week later, Chiang Kai-shek executed his coup against the Communists in Shanghai and Nanking. The fifth congress of the CCP denounced Chiang's Nanking wing of the KMT, but not the KMT as a whole. The CCP central committee shortly thereafter called upon the Wuhan wing of the KMT to carry on the revolution in opposition to Chiang.

At the fifth congress, Chen Tu-hsiu was obliged to offer a confession of errors--of which he was not guilty--but he was not removed as Secretary General at that time. The congress elected a central committee with only three holdovers. Among the nine or more additional persons named were the three who today are the top three men in the CCP hierarchy, Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-chi, and Chou En-lai. Mao had spend much of the previous two years as a peasant organizer in Hunan, and may for part of 1926 have been director of a central peasants' department of the CCP. The date of the first appearance of a CCP politburo is uncertain

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The first politburo was dominated by persons opposed to Chen Tu-hsiu. The politburo was reportedly reorganized within two months;

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The party's central departments

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may or may not have remained stable through the summer.

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Emergency Conference, August 1927

In August 1927, an emergency conference of the CCP was held in Chiuchiang, Kiangsi, to consider the party's situation in the light of the break with the Wuhan wing of the KMT. The Wuhan wing on 15 July had announced its intention to "sever all relations" with the CCP, and on 1 August the CCP had led an unsuccessful military revolt at Nanchang. Rather than formalizing this break, the conference, reflecting Stalin's position in his quarrel with Trotsky, called for the CCP to continue to attempt "to achieve hegemony within the KMT." The conference recognized the new situation, however, in setting forth a program centering on armed insurrection.

The emergency conference made Secretary General Chen Tu-hsiu the scapegoat for the disasters of the Comintern-directed collaboration with the KMT. Chen was replaced by Chu Chiu-pai, who had been the leader of the opposition to Chen and who may have been mainly responsible for calling this very small and unrepresentative conference. The conference elected an "interim politburo" of about seven full members, which was also to act as the entire central committee until the convocation of a party congress. Chu Chiu-pai was presumably a member of the new politburo; others indicated on Chart I may or may not have been members.

A plenum of the CCP central committee, presumably dominated by Chu, met in November 1927 to endorse the Comintern's belief in a "revolutionary wave" in China. The plenum expelled politburo member Tan Ping-shan, a supporter of Chen Tu-hsiu.

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SECRETARY GENERAL

Hsiang Chung-fa, Secy-Genl
 Chen Shao-yu, Secy-Genl
 Chin Pang-hsien, Secy-Genl
 CHANG WEN-TIEN, Secy-Genl
 MAO TSE-TUNG, Chairman

[illegible]

MAO TSE-TUNG

Chang Kuo'-t'ao
 CHOU EN-LAI
 Chu Chiu-pai
 Pien Pih-shih
 LI LEE-shan
 LI Wei-han
 LIU SHAO-CHI
 Hsiang Chung-fa
 Hsiang Ying
 Ku Shun-chang
 Lo Chang-lung
 Lo I-yuan
 Peng Pai
 Tsai Chang
 Tsi: Ho-sheng
 Fang Chih-min
 Teng Chung-hsia
 Wang Jo-wei
 Hu Wen-chiang
 KANG SHENG
 Chen Yu
 CHANG WEN-TIEN
 Chen Shao-yu
 Chin Pang-hsien
 Wang Chia-hsiang
 Seng Ching-shu
 Ser: Tse-min
 SHEN YU
 LIN PO-CHU
 CHU TE
 LI FU-CHUN
 PENG TE-HUAI
 Kai Feng
 TUNG PI-WU
 TUNG Ying-chao

[illegible]

CHOU EN-LAI
Hsiang Chung-fa
Chu Chiu-pai
Li Li-san
Chang Kuo-tao
Hsiang Ying
Tsal Ho-sheng
Li Wei-han
Chen Shao-yu
CHANG WEN-TI
Chin Pang-hsien
LIU SHAO-CHI
Shen Tse-min
Jen P'ei-shih
Meng Ching-shu
MAO TSE-TUNG
CHU TE
Wang Chia-hsiang
CHEN YUN
PENG TE-HUAI
LIN PO-CHU

[illegible]

Current Politburo members in CAPITALS.
Current Central Committee members underlined.
Striped blocks indicate alternate member.

Chart III 25X1

CENTRAL PARTY ORGANS 1928-1944 (Continued)

SECRETARIAT		1928	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944
	CHOU EN-LAI	?	?	?	?	?	?											
	CHANG WEN-TIEN																	
	Wang Chia-hsiang																	
	MAO TSE-TUNG																	
	LI FU-CHUN																	
	LIU SHAO-CHI				?													
	Jen Pi-shih																	

* Chairman of Secretariat from 1933

CENTRAL DEPARTMENTS

Organization	Dir:	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944
	CHOU EN-LAI																	
	CHANG WEN-TIEN																	
	LI FU-CHUN																	
	LIU SHAO-CHI																	
	CHEN YUN																	
	Jen Pi-shih																	
	PENG CHEN																	

Propaganda	Dir:	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944
	LI LI-SAN																	
	Shen Tse-min																	
	CHANG WEN-TIEN																	
	Wu Liang-ping																	
	Kai Feng																	

Security	Dir:	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944
	Teng Fa	?	?	?														
	Wang Shou-tao																	
	KANG SHENG																	
	Dep: LI KO-NUNG																	

Peasants (uncertain after 1932)	Dir:	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944
	Pang Pai																	
	Lo I-yuan																	
	CHANG WEN-TIEN																	

Labor (uncertain after 1928)	Dir:	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944
	LIU SHAO-CHI	?																
	LI LI-SAN	?																

Women's Work (uncertain after 1931)	Dir:	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944
	Teng Ying-chao		?	?														
	Meng Ching-shu																	

Military (uncertain after 1935)	Dir:	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944
	CHOU EN-LAI	?																
	Hu Wen-chiang	?																
	MAO TSE-TUNG																	

General Political (Created 1931)	Dir:	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944
	Wang Chia-hsiang																	
	Jen Pi-shih																	
	Dep: LI FU-CHUN																	
	TENG HSIAO-PING																	
	Tan Cheng																	

United Front	Dir:	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944
	Chen Shao-yu																	
	KO CHING-SHIH																	
	Li Wei-han																	

Current Politburo members in CAPITALS.

Current Central Committee members underlined.

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Sixth Congress, July-September 1928

The sixth congress met in Moscow, where the delegates were both safe from the KMT and under the Comintern's gun. Like the fifth congress, it was held to consider the farcical failure of the Comintern's line. The CCP's major insurrections since the fifth congress--in Hunan (led by Mao), at Swatow, and at Canton--had come to nothing. The Comintern itself being infallible, the congress condemned the two secretaries general who had attempted to implement the Comintern's line: Chen Tu-hsiu, denounced as an opportunist for being too conciliatory to the Wuhan wing of the KMT, and Chu Chiu-pai, denounced as a military adventurist for the failure of the various fall and winter uprisings.

In a long and confused resolution which is susceptible to varying interpretations, the congress described the party's central tasks as those of overthrowing imperialism and carrying out an agrarian revolution, to be preceded by the establishment of Chinese soviets. The congress directed the party, among other things, to strengthen its base in the proletariat, to give greater attention to the peasantry, and to "prepare for armed uprisings" at the next "revolutionary rising tide." Various pronouncements of the congress were in effect an endorsement of Mao Tse-tung's organizational work among the peasants in Hunan as one line of action among others.

The congress named as party secretary general Hsiang Chung-fa, a labor organizer who soon became a front for another labor organizer, Li Li-san. These two were presumably the proper type to enlist the "proletariat." The congress re-elected six or eight members of the central committee--including Mao Tse-tung, who had been expelled again in the autumn of 1927 and was still, in summer 1928, with guerrilla forces in South China--and elected a number of new members and alternates. It named a new politburo, centering on Li Li-san and Chou En-lai. A party secretariat may have been established, possibly under Chou. Of the central departments, the organization department was placed under Chou En-lai; propaganda, under Li Li-san; the peasants' department, under Peng Pai, who seems to have preceded Mao in recognizing the peasants' potential; and labor, under Liu Shao-chi or Li Li-san. Three new departments were apparently established at this time: a military department, under Chou En-lai or Hu Wen-chiang; a women's department, under Chou's wife, Teng Ying-chao; and a party security (police) department, possibly under Teng Fa.

Second Plenum of Sixth Central Committee, June 1929

The second plenum of the sixth central committee--i.e., the committee elected at the sixth congress in the summer of 1928--was held after another nine months of, if not spectacular failure, surely little success. Communist-led guerrilla forces were surviving, but little more, and worker membership in the CCP was actually declining. The KMT was doing much better, both militarily and politically. The second plenum took note of this fact, but could think of nothing better to do than to reaffirm the positions taken at the sixth congress.

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The second plenum apparently made no important changes in the party's central organs. Later in 1929 some party members who had once been important, including Chen Tu-hsiu, were expelled from the CCP for oppositionist activity, and the peasant leader Peng Pai was caught and executed by the KMT.

Third Plenum of Sixth Central Committee, Autumn 1930

The third plenum of the sixth central committee began in August 1930 immediately following the failure of a second Communist-led attack on Changsha. Since the previous autumn, the Comintern, on the specious ground that a new "revolutionary upsurge" was imminent in China, had been pressing the dominant Li Li-san group in the CCP leadership to resume a violent program. This line was echoed by a group of young Chinese Communists, led by Chen Shao-yu, who had returned in the spring of 1930 from study in the USSR. These "returned students"--or "young Bolsheviks"--led the attack on Li Li-san at the 3rd plenum for the failure of the operation against Changsha, apparently on the ground that Li had misunderstood the Comintern's position (as failure could only be due to misunderstanding). Li was ably supported at the plenum by Chou En-lai, who argued that the party had faithfully followed the Comintern's line and that the line would yet be vindicated. Surprisingly the plenum upheld Li and Chou against the apparent desire of Moscow to depose Li. The third plenum, like the second, apparently made no major changes in the party's central organs.

The Comintern--possibly following representations by the Comintern representative in China on behalf of his protégés, the "returned students"--soon made its position clear beyond doubt. A Comintern letter of November 1930 made Li the third scapegoat for the failure of the Comintern's line. Li immediately resigned from the CCP politburo and soon went to Moscow, where he remained for almost 15 years.

Fourth Plenum of Sixth Central Committee, January 1931

The fourth plenum of the sixth central committee was held to confirm the triumph of the "returned student" group in the struggle for power which followed the fall of Li Li-san. The plenum condemned Li, like Chu Chiu-pai in 1928, for military adventurism. Its resolution, in describing as Li's "clumsiest mistake" the attempt to seize major cities without a strong base in Chinese soviet areas, and in its statement of several other points, suggested an intention to give greater emphasis to the development of the soviet areas. However, it was the "returned students" in the Shanghai headquarters, not the leaders of the Soviet areas, who were named to dominant positions in the party.

The fourth plenum confirmed Hsiang Chung-fa as secretary general, but apparently as a front for Chen Shao-yu. At least four "returned students"--Chen, Chang Wen-tien, Chin Pang-hsien, and Shen Tse-min--were named to the politburo to replace Li Li-san and some of his supporters. Chou En-lai, who had withdrawn his support of Li following the Comintern letter, was re-elected to the politburo;

sixth central committee convened in the same month, apparently not to set forth new policies but to make a number of changes in the party's central organs.

[redacted] the plenum named to the central committee three men who were close to Mao--the military leaders Chu Te and Peng Tehuai, and Lin Po-chu--and two others Chen Yun and Li Fu-chun, who if not yet close to Mao were closer to him than to the "returned students." Added to the small politburo were Chu Te and the "returned student" Wang Chia-hsiang. The politburo thus continued to be divided about evenly between the group around Chin Pang-hsien and Chou En-lai and the group around Mao. The former group apparently continued to hold most of the central departments. Chou En-lai and Chang Wen-tien headed the secretariat; Chang gave up the organization department to an unidentified person, but took over the propaganda department; Chou retained the military department; and Wang Chia-hsiang remained head of the general political department.

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The Tsunyi Conference, January 1935

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In October 1934, the Chinese Communist movement was not quite "exterminated" by Chiang Kai-shek's forces but was dislodged from its Kiangsi base. Chin Pang-hsien and Chou En-lai

[redacted] made the decision to undertake the Long March to the northwest. En route, at Tsunyi in Kweichow Province, the CCP politburo called an "enlarged conference" in January 1935. It was this conference which, in the words of an official party history, marked the end of the period of dominance of the "third 'leftist' line" (i.e., since autumn 1931) and marked also the establishment of Mao Tse-tung's "leading position in the central organs and in the party as a whole."

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Mao at Tsunyi successfully attacked the policies of the Chin Pang-hsien group and the Comintern's military adviser. Mao reportedly accused them of serious military mistakes--both in the Kiangsi period and during the march--which had caused heavy losses to Chinese Communist forces. (Mao later said that the Kiangsi soviet had been lost as a result of adopting positional instead of guerrilla tactics and of failing to unite with the anti-KMT guerrillas in Fukien; and Communist writers more recently have accused the CCP's "leftist dogmatists" of that time with early "adventurism" on the march, later "conservatism", and final "panic and retreat.")

Mao at Tsunyi had the support of those who had been close to him for some years and of others who thereafter were close to him, possibly including Chou En-lai, although accounts differ on this point. It was apparently at this conference that Chang Wen-tien, a member of Chin's group rather than Mao's, became the CCP secretary general, presumably because Mao's "leading position" was not yet

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so strong that he could have his way completely. However, Mao joined Chang and Chou En-lai in the Secretariat, and took over from Chou the important military department, with Chou remaining his deputy. At least one of Mao's supporters, Peng Te-huai, was reportedly added to the politburo, which would have given Mao's group a majority on that body even without Chou En-lai. Mao's solid supporters at that level seemed to be Chu Te, Liu Shao-chi, Peng Te-huai, and Jen Pi-shih.

The Shift to Yen-an, 1935-36

The CCP leadership in 1935 and 1936 was occupied primarily with shifting the party's territorial base to Shensi Province. Forces led by Mao, Chu Te, and Peng Te-huai made a junction with forces led by Hsu Hsiang-chien and Chang Kuo-tao in Szechuan in or about June 1935. In July and August the party held a conference in northern Szechuan, and issued a proclamation calling on all classes to fight against Japan. A dispute arose between Mao and Chang Kuo-tao as to whether to proceed to Shensi or, as Chang wished, to Sinkiang; Mao resolved the dispute by simply departing for Shensi, taking with him the larger part of the party's military forces and accompanied by most of the party's leaders who had come with him from Kiangsi, including Chou En-lai, whose support of Mao dates at least from this time. Chu Te, although apparently a supporter of Mao, was left behind with--perhaps detained by--the Hsu-Chang forces. Mao's forces arrived at a small Soviet area in Shensi, operated by local Communists, in the autumn of 1935. Shortly thereafter, Mao was obliged to put down an anti-Mao faction among the Shensi Communists which had the support of Secretary General Chang Wen-tien.

In November 1935 the Comintern set forth the united front as its world-wide policy. In December, the CCP resolved to establish an anti-Japanese united front in China. In the summer of 1936, the CCP made overtures to the KMT for the formation of such a front, but got no response. In December 1936, the CCP brought a united front closer by helping to effect the release of Chiang Kai-shek, who had been held at Sian by Chinese military leaders dissatisfied with his conduct of the war. In the same month, CCP headquarters was established at Yen-an, and the military forces which had been left in Szechuan in 1935 finally joined the main forces in Shensi.

Chang Wen-tien remained secretary general of the CCP throughout this period, although he apparently counted for little after 1935. Mao Tse-tung, already the party's dominant figure, became increasingly so. There were apparently no important changes in the composition of the central committee, politburo, and secretariat in these years. There were certain changes, however, in the central departments. Li Fu-chun, who had been deputy director of the general political department, took over the organization department in 1935 and kept it until some time in 1937. A Mao-man, Jen Pi-shih, took over the general political department from a "returned student," with Teng Hsiao-ping as deputy. Wu Liang-ping, who soon dropped out of sight, may have taken over the propaganda department

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for a year or so. The military department may or may not have remained under Mao. The party security department apparently remained under Teng Fa.

Formation of a "United Front," 1937

The CCP in 1937 renewed its efforts to form a united front with the KMT against the Japanese. These efforts were unrewarded until September, two months after the Sino-Japanese war had begun. At that time, the KMT accepted a CCP statement, drafted in July, which among other things promised to abandon the policy of seeking the overthrow of the KMT by force, to abolish the Chinese soviet government, and to place Communist forces under the central government's control. The CCP actually intended, as some KMT leaders knew, to retain control of its territorial bases, to maintain its own armed forces, and to engage in these actions which would best advance its own fortunes. Mao Tse-tung in October was obliged to make this policy clear to his own lieutenants. Chang Kuo-tao, who had lost a major dispute with Mao in 1935, contended that there should be a more nearly genuine merging of CCP and KMT efforts, while Mao insisted on the primacy of the CCP's long-range interests. Chang lost again, and a few months later fled and defected to the KMT.

Meanwhile, in the early autumn of 1937 Chinese Communist forces (the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army) had been reorganized as the 8th Route Army. Chu Te became commander in chief and Peng Te-huai his deputy, with Jen Pi-shih and Tan Cheng as their political equivalents in the general political department. Three divisions were organized, commanded "jointly" by Lin Piao (military) and Lo Jung-huan (political), by Liu Po-cheng (military) and Teng Hsiao-ping (political), and by Ho Lung (military) and Kuan Hsiang-ying (political). Three of these persons--Chu Te, Peng Te-huai, and Jen Pi-shih--were already members of the CCP politburo, and five others were added many years later. These forces in late 1937 began to harass the Japanese rear.

There were no reported changes in the central committee and politburo in 1937. Li Fu-chun, director of the organization department, may conceivably have been added to the secretariat. Liu Shao-chi may have replaced Li as organization director. A united front department was added late in 1937, and placed under Chen Shao-yu, the onetime secretary general just returned from Moscow. The party security department apparently passed at this time from Teng Fa to Kang Sheng, a friend of Chen Shao-yu's in Moscow who had returned with him. Kang seems to have had primary responsibility for intelligence and security work directed at the party, and supervisory authority over such work directed outside the party. The latter seems to have been directed by Li Ko-nung, a career specialist, who perhaps had the title of deputy director of the over-all party security department, later known as the social affairs department.

Sixth Plenum of Sixth Central Committee, November 1938

During 1938, Communist forces advanced into several provinces of northern and eastern China. The sixth plenum of the sixth central

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committee met in Yen-an in November 1938 to hear a report by Mao Tse-tung on the "new stage" of the party's effort and to rebuff Chen Shao-yu once more. Mao in his report presumably expatiated on the line taken in a party propaganda directive a few months earlier: that the CCP must "stand firm in the anti-Japanese national united front" and at the same time must "steadfastly maintain the party's political and organizational independence, expand and reinforce the party forces,...and develop our traditional spirit of relentless struggle." The sixth plenum supported Mao's position--of struggle within union--against Chen Shao-yu, who appears, like Chang Kuo-tao earlier, to have advocated a more nearly honest union with the central government. Chen kept his title as director of the united front department, but was never again of any importance in the CCP.

The sixth plenum made no known changes in the central committee and politburo except to formalize the defection of Chang Kuo-tao and reportedly to remove onetime Secretary General Chin Pang-hsien from the politburo and replace him with Lin Po-chu. Sometime earlier, Chen Yun, who is said to have supported Mao at Tsunyi in 1935, had taken over the organization department; and Kai Feng, a "returned student," had taken over the propaganda department.

The Period 1939-41

The Chinese Communists became increasingly engaged with the Japanese, and had increasing trouble with the KMT, in the period 1939-41. The sorest instance of the latter came early in 1941, when central government forces attacked the headquarters of the Communist-led New 4th Army in East China, and disbanded the army, remnants of which escaped under Chen Yi.

Mao Tse-tung in these years periodically reaffirmed his support of the united front. In 1940, he published a long theoretical justification of the united front strategy, "On the New Democracy," which seemed to be aimed in two directions. On one hand, Mao apparently wished to persuade KMT leaders and the Chinese public that they had nothing to fear from the CCP's present or "minimum" program; to this end, he minimized those features of the party's position, such as its own armed forces and territorial base, designed for struggle with the KMT for sole control of China. On the other hand, Mao seemed concerned to reassure the CCP itself, to the lowest levels, that the party leadership's long-range or "maximum" program remained orthodox, and that the united front was a convenience which would not last forever.

Chen Yun was probably added to the politburo in this period (about 1940), and the politburo may have lost Hsiang Ying, killed in the New 4th Army incident. Jen Pi-shih is believed to have taken over the organization department from Chen Yun in or about 1940. Sometime earlier, Wang Chia-hsiang had again become director of the general political department, replacing Jen Pi-shih.

SECRETThe Period 1942-44

Chinese Communist forces in the years 1942-44 continued to harass the Japanese, at some points very effectively, and to improve their over-all military position for an eventual showdown with the KMT. Mao Tse-tung in this period took the final step in consolidating his personal position. Apparently seeing the only possible threat in the remaining "returned students" who regarded themselves as superior interpreters of Marxism-Leninism, Mao set out to establish himself as foremost in this field. The party "rectification" campaign of these years, while designed to raise the level of indoctrination and efficiency of the party as a whole, had the effect of further reducing the stature of onetime Secretaries General Chen Shao-yu, Chin Pang-hsien, and Chang Wen-tien, and apparently resulted in the demotion of Wang Chia-hsiang as well.

Mao became chairman of the central committee and/or politburo in 1943, and the post of secretary general disappeared. Chang Wen-tien and Wang Chia-hsiang were probably dropped from the politburo at about the same time, leaving that body composed entirely of Mao's supporters and completely responsive to Mao. Chang was apparently dropped also from the secretariat at this time (as was Wang, if he was still a member), and Liu Shao-chi was added to the secretariat, leaving that body--under Mao's chairmanship--also composed entirely of Mao men. Jen Pi-shih apparently kept the organization department; however, Peng Chen may have displaced him in 1943, with Jen moving unannounced to the secretariat, and some sources restore Chen Yun to the organization department in 1943-44. There were no reported changes in the propaganda and security departments. The united front department passed from the disgraced Chen Shao-yu to other party leaders. Similarly, the general political department, although still nominally under the direction of the demoted Wang Chia-hsiang, probably passed to other party leaders.

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Chart V 25X1

CENTRAL PARTY ORGANS 1945-1956 (Continued)

DEPARTMENTS		1945	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955
Staff Office:	Dir: <u>Yang Shang-kun</u>	?	?	?	?							
Organization:	Dir: PENG CHEN	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?		?	?
	Jen Pi-shih	?	?	?	?	?	Died, 1950					
	Jao Shu-shih										Purged, 1954	
	TENG HSIAO-PING										?	?
	Dep: <u>An Tzu-wen</u>										?	?
Propaganda:	Dir: LU TING-I											
	<u>Hsi Chung-hsun</u>											
	Dep: <u>Hsu-T e-li</u>						?	?	?	?	?	
	CHEN PO-TA											?
	<u>Hu Chiao-mu</u>											
	LU TING-I											
	<u>Chang Chi-chun</u>									?		
	<u>Chou Yang</u>											
Social Affairs:	Dir: KANG SHENG	?	?	?	?						?	?
	<u>Li Ko-nung</u>	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?		?
	Dep: <u>Li Ko-nung</u>	?	?	?	Promoted ?							
United Front:	Dir: <u>Li Wei-han</u>											
	Dep: <u>Hsu Ping</u>											
	<u>Liu Ko-p ing</u>						?					
	Yu I-fu											
	<u>Liao-Ch eng-chih</u>						?	?	?	?		
	Ping Chieh-san											
	Chang Chih-i											
Women's Work:	Secy: <u>Tsal Chang</u>		?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
	<u>Teng Ying-chao</u>		?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
Central Control Comm. Secy: TUNG PI-WU												
Rural Work:	Dir: <u>Teng Tzu-hui</u>											
	Dep: <u>Liao Lu-yen</u>											
	CHEN PO-TA											
	<u>Chen Cheng-jen</u>											
General Political:	Dir:	?	?	?	?	?						
	LO JUNG-HUAN											
	Tan Cheng											
	<u>Hsiao Hua</u>											
	<u>Kan Szu-chi</u>											

Current Politburo members in CAPITALS.
Current Central Committee members underlined.

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Seventh CCP Congress, April-June 1945

The seventh congress of the CCP, held in Yenan, met to consider the party's position in the coming postwar struggle with the central government and to reconfirm Mao Tse-tung's personal domination of the party.

Mao gave the principal report to the congress, "On Coalition Government." Predicting that victory over the Japanese was near, he concentrated on defining the CCP's relationship with the KMT in the years to come. He reported that CCP negotiations with the KMT for a "coalition"--negotiations under way through Chou En-lai since 1944--had thus far been unsuccessful. Repeating his concept of "new democracy," Mao assured his audience of the CCP's willingness to "cooperate" with all parties and persons who were "not hostile." This formulation left the CCP free either to enter a "coalition" with the KMT, as tentatively agreed to in January 1946, or to proclaim a "coalition" with various puppet parties after a military victory over the KMT, as was in fact done in 1949. Mao made clear to his audience that the CCP, with a claimed troop strength of 900,000 regulars, was prepared to continue to combine military means of struggle with political means.

The congress also heard a long report by Liu Shao-chi--a report second in importance only to Mao's--on the revision of the party constitution. The new constitution, probably drafted by Liu, specified that the party "guides its entire work by...the thought of Mao Tse-tung." In discussing the functions of central party organs, the constitution stated that the central committee was to meet in plenary session twice a year, and was to elect in such sessions its chairman and the members of the politburo and secretariat. Further, the politburo was to be "the central leading body of the party and direct all work of the party" between plenary sessions of the central committee, and the secretariat was to "attend to the daily work of the central committee" under the direction of the politburo; the chairman of the central committee was to be concurrently chairman of the politburo and secretariat. Finally, the central committee was to set up the necessary central departments, which were to function under the direction of the central committee chairman and of the politburo and secretariat. It was apparent that the central committee as a body would have the function only of meeting periodically to approve decisions on policies and personnel already made by a small group of party leaders; and the seventh congress elected a central committee so large--44 regular and 33 alternate members--that it would not be able to function significantly in any case. (The membership of the central committee therefore is not given on Chart IV or on subsequent charts.)

The new central committee immediately elected Mao to the three concurrent chairmanships. It named to the politburo the eight party leaders believed to constitute the politburo prior to the congress, restored one who had apparently been dropped in 1943 (Chang Wen-tien), and named four for the first time: Kao Kang, the Shensi Communist leader who had cooperated with Mao against Chang Wen-tien in 1936-37; Peng Chen, an associate of Liu Shao-chi, who like Liu had been very useful to Mao in the "rectification" campaign of 1942; Kang Sheng, the party security chief who had also been active

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in "rectification"; and Tung Pi-wu, one of the founders of the CCP in 1921 who had subsequently worked closely with both Mao and Chou En-lai. The 13-man politburo of 1945 thus was composed of Mao, 11 persons who had actively supported Mao for some years, and one (Chang) who was chastened and presumably repentant.

The new central committee named as full members of the secretariat the three leaders known to have been secretaries prior to the seventh congress--Mao, Liu and Chou--plus Chu Te and Jen Pi-shih. This group, less Chu Te, was the inner core of the CCP leadership, and the secretariat rather than the politburo thereafter became the most powerful organ of the party. Named as alternate members were Chen Yun, Peng Chen and probably Kang Sheng. All of these persons--both full and alternate members--were also politburo members, and all were Mao men. Of this group, Liu Shao-chi was clearly Mao's first lieutenant, and in the next year was twice identified as the party's vice chairman--although there was no formal provision for this post.

Of the central departments known to be in operation at the time of the seventh congress, at least three probably continued under the same directors. Jen Pi-shih seems more likely than Peng Chen--both were reported--to have been director of the organization department after the congress, as Peng was dispatched to Manchuria to serve as the party chief there for some years. Kang Sheng and Li Ko-nung reportedly retained the party security department, which became known at about that time as the "social affairs" department. Li Wei-han continued as director of the united front department. The propaganda department was transferred from Kai Feng, who may have been ailing, to Lu Ting-i, a longtime lieutenant of Jen Pi-shih. The women's work department re-emerged under Tsai Chang (Li Fu-chun's wife), with the previous director, Teng Ying-chao (Chou En-lai's wife), as her deputy. The staff office (administrative office) of the central committee, with a status similar to that of the central departments, appeared at this time.

Failure of Negotiations, 1946-47

With the Japanese surrender in August 1945, the Chinese Communists moved quickly to get in the strongest possible position for negotiations with the KMT or, if necessary, civil war. The best forces, under Lin Piao, moved into Manchuria, accompanied by party leaders Chen Yun, Kao Kang, Peng Chen, and Li Fu-chun. Strong forces under Chen Yi and Su Yu, with Jao Shu-shih as political officer, operated in eastern China. Strong forces under Liu Po-cheng (commander) and Teng Hsiao-ping (political officer) were active in parts of northern and central China. Forces commanded by Nieh Jung-chen and Ho Lung expanded in parts of northern and northwestern China. Chu Te and Peng Te-huai remained in Yen-an to direct over-all operations.

In August 1945, Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai went to Chungking for talks with Chiang Kai-shek, culminating in an October statement of their common desire for peace and unity. A "political consultative conference" was arranged, with KMT, CCP, and nonparty delegates. In January 1946, CCP and KMT negotiators concluded a

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cease-fire agreement, and the political consultative conference passed resolutions providing for an interim "coalition" regime until one could be formally established. Soon thereafter, Nationalist and Communist forces began to clash in Manchuria, from which Soviet troops were withdrawing on a schedule convenient to the Chinese Communist forces, leaving stores of Japanese materiel behind. In April, Chou En-lai declared that a state of hostilities existed in Manchuria, and the Communists attacked Changchun. Fighting spread, and negotiations made no progress. Nationalist forces had a number of successes against the Communists in the latter half of 1946 and early 1947 but became over-extended in Manchuria and northern China, and during 1947 the initiative passed to the Communist forces, which had not been appreciably reduced.

In December 1947, Mao Tse-tung reported to a CCP conference in northern Shensi--Yenan had been evacuated--on "The Present Situation and Our Tasks." Mao told the party--an estimate with which many Western observers agreed--that the civil war had reached a "turning point" in favor of the Communists, whose forces had "gone over to the offensive on a nationwide scale." Mao restated the concept of a united front as a united front of all forces opposed to Chiang Kai-shek, similar to the "democratic forces headed by the Soviet Union" which opposed the "mad plans of American imperialist elements...for enslaving the world...."

The CCP made no announced changes in its major central organs in the period from the seventh congress (1945) through the central committee plenum of December 1947. However, Kang Sheng may conceivably have lost the post of director of the party security department in this period.

Second Plenum of Seventh Central Committee, March 1949

The second plenum met at Shihchiachuang in Hopei after a year of almost unbroken successes by Communist military forces. Communist forces had taken most of China north of the Yangtze, were about to take Nanking and Shanghai, were apparently not to encounter any serious opposition in taking the rest of mainland China, and would soon be in a position to proclaim a government for all of China. The second plenum prepared for this by resolving to shift the center of party work from the countryside to the cities, to train its members for rehabilitation of the economy, and to rally all nonhostile classes to build a "new democratic" China.

In July 1949, on the 28th anniversary of the founding of the CCP, Mao Tse-tung published his essay "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship." Mao made clear to all Chinese, inside and outside the party, that his regime, while a "coalition" with an ostensibly gradualist program, would be a genuine dictatorship--exercised by the CCP in the name of the "people"--which would take as its first task the strengthening of state organs for the suppression of "reactionaries." Mao also stated that the Chinese "must ally ourselves with the Soviet Union...and all New Democratic countries...; to sit on the fence is impossible; a third road does not exist." He added that "genuine friendly aid" could come only from Communist states.

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No major changes in the central organs of the CCP were announced in this period. However, some major changes may have been made, and some minor changes came to light. Kang Sheng was apparently dropped from the secretariat at about this time and transferred to Shantung Province; Kang may have been relieved earlier as head of the party's security department, as Peiping in the same year identified Li Ko-nung as "former" head of that department. Peng Chen, the party boss in Manchuria since 1945, came to Peiping in 1949 to take over the CCP's Peiping committee, and may at the same time have taken over the party's organization department from Jen Pi-shih, sick and soon to die. An Tzu-wen, an obscure figure who may have been a political officer, appeared as a deputy director of this department in 1949. Chen Po-ta and Hu Chiao-mu, theorists who had helped Mao to establish himself in the early 1940's as the CCP's foremost exponent of Marxism-Leninism, were added to the propaganda department as deputy directors. Yang Shang-kun, who had worked closely in earlier years with Liu Shao-chi, Chou En-lai and Chu Te, was identified at this time as head of the staff (administrative) office of the central committee.

Third Plenum of Seventh Central Committee, June 1950

The People's Republic of China was proclaimed in Peiping--before the mainland was completely occupied by Chinese Communist forces--on 1 October 1949. Mao Tse-tung was named chairman of the Central People's Government; Chu Te, Liu Shao-chi, and Kao Kang among the vice chairmen; Chou En-lai as premier (the most important government post); Chen Yun as the top coordinator of economic work; Tung Pi-wu as the top coordinator of political-legal work; and Lin Po-chu as senior administrator. The regime was immediately occupied with extending and consolidating its control, rehabilitating the economy, and formalizing its relationship with the USSR (done in the Sino-Soviet treaty of friendship and alliance in February 1950).

The third plenum of the seventh central committee, meeting in Peiping, heard a report from Mao on the economic situation. Mao foresaw a "fundamental turn for the better" in about three years, and called for a "large-scale ideological remolding" of the party to prepare it for its tasks. Liu Shao-chi outlined to the plenum the program for land-reform in three years. The plenum made no announced changes in the party's central organs. However, Chen Yun was soon to become a full member of the secretariat with the death of Jen Pi-shih. In addition, at about this time Lo Jung-huan, long a political officer with Lin Piao, was named director of the general political department, which had apparently been operating for some years under an unidentified acting director; Hsiao Hua, long a lieutenant of Lo's, became his deputy.

Four politburo members, and several military and political leaders who were later to be named to the politburo, were key figures in the regional administrations which had been or were being established throughout mainland China. These administrations were combinations of party bureaus, military headquarters, and civil governments. Peng Chen (politburo) was the top man in the Peiping administration, by far the most sensitive of any municipal center of power. Kao Kang (politburo) held all the top posts in the Northeast (Manchuria), assisted by Li Fu-chun. Ulanfu held all the top

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posts in neighboring Inner Mongolia. Peng Te-huai (politburo) and Hsi Chung-hsun were the top men in the Northwest. Liu Po-cheng, Ho Lung, and, especially, Teng Hsiao-ping were the key figures in the Southwest. Jao Shu-shih and Chen Yi dominated East China, with Kang Sheng (politburo) the top man in Shantung Province. Lin Piao, Yeh Chien-ying, and Teng Tzu-hui were the key figures in the very large and populous area of Central-South China. Po I-po, Nieh Jung-chen, and Liu Lan-tao held the top posts in North China.

The Period 1950-53

The CCP was occupied in the period from June 1950 to the end of 1953 primarily with the Korean war, the establishment of totalitarian controls over Chinese society, the development--with Soviet aid--of the Chinese Communist armed forces and the Chinese economy, and the "rectification" of the party itself. There were neither any plenums of the central committee nor any national party conferences in this period. ILLEGIB

Mao Tse-tung continued to initiate the party's most important programs, and pronouncements by other party leaders--especially on the 30th anniversary of the party in July 1951--made clear that his domination was not being challenged. Liu Shao-chi, consistently ranked second in the hierarchy, made the major pronouncements (on Mao's behalf) on party affairs, and spoke frequently on government affairs. Chou En-lai, generally ranked third, remained the principal voice on government work and foreign affairs, including the Korean war and the status of Taiwan. Generally ranked fourth, but clearly displaced by Peng Te-huai as the most important military leader, was Chu Te. Moving into fourth place in actual power was Kao Kang. Liu, Chou, Chu, and Kao were the four party leaders described by Peiping, during 1953, as Mao's "close comrades-in-arms."

Of the other members of the politburo, Chen Yun, Peng Chen, and Peng Te-huai seemed the most important. Chen remained on the secretariat and continued as the regime's top economic coordinator. Peng Chen, an alternate member of the secretariat and probable director of the organization department, was second only to Liu Shao-chi in speaking on party affairs. Peng Te-huai late in 1950 became commander of Chinese Communist forces in Korea, keeping this post through 1953. Other politburo members played lesser roles: Tung Pi-wu and Lin Po-chu kept their previous posts in the state administration, Kang Sheng remained in Shantung and out of the news, and Chang Wen-tien in 1951 succeeded Wang Chia-hsiang as ambassador to the USSR.

Several regional leaders were pulled to Peiping in this period to assume key posts at the center. Kao Kang and Li Fu-chun were brought from the Northeast to become chairman and deputy chairman of the new State Planning Commission, with Kao reportedly joining the party secretariat at the same time; Lin Feng became top man in the Northeast. Hsi Chung-hsun came from the Northwest to become director of the propaganda department, with Lu Ting-i, for reasons still obscure, dropping to deputy director; Ma Ming-fang became top man in the Northwest. Jao Shu-shih was brought from ILLEGIB

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East China to the key post of director of the organization department, with An Tzu-wen, who spoke frequently on party affairs, remaining as deputy; Chen Yi became the ranking figure in East China, but the top man on the spot after 1952 was Tan Chen-lin. Teng Hsiao-ping came from his post as party boss of the Southwest to take up both party and government affairs at the center, and Liu Po-cheng was named commander of the regime's principal military academy (at Nanking), leaving Ho Lung, Sung Jen-chiang, and Chang Chi-chun in the Southwest. Lin Piao retained his titles in the Central-South, but after 1951 was inactive and in a sanitarium; Yeh Chien-ying and Teng Tzu-hui were the top men in the Central-South until Teng came to Peiping in 1953 to be director of the party's new rural work department, at which time Tan Cheng became Yeh's top lieutenant, with Li Hsien-nien and Li Hsieh-feng in important posts in that region. Po I-po, Nieh Jung-chen, and Liu Lan-tao retained their posts in the North China Administration while concurrently holding key jobs in Peiping.

Fourth Plenum of Seventh Central Committee, February 1954

The fourth plenum met in Peiping in February 1954 primarily to consider the threat to the party of the top-level factionalism which had been discovered a few weeks earlier. Mao himself was absent, possibly owing to embarrassment that one of his leading proteges, one of his four "close comrades-in-arms," was involved. Liu Shao-chi told the plenum that Mao the previous December had proposed to the politburo that action be taken to strengthen party unity. Liu said that unspecified party leaders had sinned against the concept of party unity, and among other things had regarded their regions or departments as "their individual inheritance or independent kingdom." Chou En-lai, Chu Te, and others also made "important speeches." Liu's report and the central committee resolution on party unity both indicated that some high-ranking figures would be purged. Kao Kang, a politburo member and chairman of the State Planning Commission, and Jao Shu-shih, director of the party's organization department, had both disappeared from the news in January.

There were important changes in the central party organs in the next few months, in part reflecting the fall--not then disclosed--of Kao and Jao. In May 1954, Teng Hsiao-ping was identified as secretary general of the central committee, the party's only officer except Chairman Mao. This post was not the equivalent of the secretary generalship of the old days--the party's top post--but one consonant with the constitutional role of the party secretariat as responsible for handling the daily work of the central committee under the direction of the politburo; Teng presumably became a member of the party secretariat at that time. Kao Kang was presumably dropped from the politburo early in 1954--and from the secretariat, if he had indeed been a member--and was replaced by Teng Hsiao-ping; Peiping first identified Teng as a politburo member in September 1954, although later stating that he was elected only in April 1955. Jao Shu-shih was presumably removed as director of the organization department early in 1954; Peng Chen may have resumed this post at that time, or Teng Hsiao-ping may have taken it over, or An Tzu-wen may have become acting

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director. Tan Cheng was brought from the Central-South to become a deputy director of the general political department; he may have been acting director, as Lo Jung-huan was apparently sick. The status of the social affairs department remained obscure; Li Koning may have continued covertly as its director, but since 1949 had held a post as deputy minister of foreign affairs which may have kept him occupied with only one part of the work of this department.

The Peiping regime was reorganized in September 1954, and party leaders were given all of the top posts, although some of them were merely honorary. Mao became chairman of the People's Republic of China, with Chu Te the only vice chairman. Liu Shao-chi became chairman of the body which was to supervise the cabinet, with Peng Chen as vice chairman and secretary general and Lin Po-chu and Lo Jung-huan as additional vice chairmen. Chou En-lai was reappointed premier and foreign minister, with Chen Yun as senior vice premier (Chen soon replaced Kao Kang among Mao's four "close comrades") and Chang Wen-tien as senior deputy foreign minister. Tung Pi-wu was named president of the supreme court, and Chang Ting-cheng, an old friend of Mao's who had been a party secretary in East China, was named procurator general. Peng Te-huai, relieved as commander of Chinese Communist forces in Korea, became minister of defense, the most important post in the military establishment.

Sometime during 1954, the party decided to abolish all of its regional bureaus, the regional governments, and the four large field armies stationed in four of the regions. This decision in part probably reflected the Kao-Jao case: as Kao and Jao had been the ranking figures in Northeast and East China and then had had key posts in Peiping, their factional activity illuminated the threat of powerful regional administrations which might either set up against the central authorities or be manipulated by factions at the center.

Almost all of the party's regional leaders who had not been brought to Peiping before the fourth plenum--in February 1954--were reassigned to Peiping in the next year. Most of the new assignments represented promotions; but some seemed to involve a substantial decline in power. The reassignments of Tan Cheng and Chang Ting-cheng--both promoted--have been noted. Others who came from regional posts to important jobs at the center were: Chang Chi-chung and Sung Jen-chiung from the Southwest (Teng Hsiao-ping's former area), Ma Ming-fang from the Northwest, Tan Chen-lin from East China, Liu Lan-tao from North China, and Li Hsueh-feng from the Central-South, to work in the central party apparatus under Teng Hsiao-ping; and Lin Feng from the Northeast, Po I-po from North China, and Li Hsien-nien from the Central-South, each of them to direct a major staff (coordinating) office of the government.

Those whose status seemed questionable were: Chen Yi from East China and Ho Lung from the Southwest, apparently reassigned as utility men for Chou En-lai; and Kang Sheng from Shantung, who appears to have remained inactive. Those who seemed more clearly to have been demoted were: Yeh Chien-ying from the Central-South, named to the comparatively unimportant post of director of the

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supervision department of the armed forces; and Nieh Jung-chen from North China, given no known job.

Fifth and Sixth Plenums of Seventh Central Committee, 1955

The fifth plenum, convened in April 1955, was immediately preceded by a party conference. Mao, Liu Shao-chi, Chen Yun, Kang Sheng, Tung Pi-wu, Peng Te-huai, and Teng Hsiao-ping addressed the conference. The most important of these speeches were those by Chen Yun, on the First Five-Year Plan (1953-57), and by Teng Hsiao-ping, who delivered the central committee report on the Kao-Jao case. The conference approved the draft plan and expelled Kao (an alleged suicide) and Jao (in jail) from the party. According to the official (and generally plausible) account, Kao and Jao had plotted in effect to depose Liu Shao-chi and Chou En-lai as Mao's two top lieutenants and rearrange the rest of the party hierarchy to make it responsive to them. The fifth plenum of the seventh central committee approved the resolutions of the party conference and elected Lin Piao and Teng Hsiao-ping to the politburo (although Teng had probably been added in 1954).

In July 1955, the regime adopted yet another draft of the First Five-Year Plan, which called for--among other things--the organization of one third of China's peasant households into agricultural cooperatives by the end of 1957. Only a few days later, Mao Tse-tung personally reversed this comparatively 'soft' line--the line of the central committee and of every party leader who had publicly spoken on the tempo of socialization. According to the text released in October 1955--when assurance of a very good harvest gave Mao the confidence to make his position public--Mao on 31 July told a conference of provincial and municipal party secretaries that socialization in the countryside was proceeding much too slowly and that "rightist" timidity must be overcome. ILLEGIB

Mao's new line made necessary a sixth plenum of the seventh central committee, which was convened in October 1955. Mao, Liu Shao-chi, Chou En-lai, Chu Te, Chen Yun, Peng Te-huai, Peng Chen, and Teng Hsiao-ping made "important speeches," no doubt in support of Mao's position. The most important speech was in fact made by Chen Po-ta, long a spokesman for Mao but not then a member of the politburo, who delivered an "explanation" of the draft resolution on agricultural socialization which made clear that the new line had originated with Mao himself. The resolution adopted by the sixth plenum did not set specific goals for agricultural socialization but encouraged the cadres to rush forward with it as rapidly as possible. The plenum also adopted a resolution--the subject of Teng Hsiao-ping's report--on convening the eighth party congress in the latter half of 1956. This resolution specified that the congress would hear reports on the work of the central committee, on the revision of the party's constitution, and on the Second Five-Year Plan, and would elect a new central committee.

Several changes in the central party organs appeared during 1955. The addition to the politburo of the fast-rising Teng Hsiao-ping and of the sick Lin Piao has been noted. Tan Chen-lin, Liu Lan-tao, Ma Ming-fang, and Yang Shang-kun were all identified as

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deputies to Secretary General Teng Hsiao-ping, and Sung Jen-chiung was later said to have been also a deputy in this period. Lu Ting-i remained director of the propaganda department, with Hsi Chung-hsun removed from the party apparatus but still administrative chief of the State Council.

Two deputy directors of the propaganda department were first identified in 1955: Chang Chi-chun, who had probably been added in 1954, and Chou Yang, one of Mao's "theorists" in the Yen-an days. Two deputy directors were added to the rural work department, which would be concerned with carrying out Mao's new line on the speed-up of agricultural socialization: Chen Po-ta, who gave the "explanation" of Mao's line at the sixth plenum, and Chen Cheng-jen, an early associate of Mao's.

Three more deputy directors appeared in the comparatively unimportant united front department. The social affairs department continued a mystery; Li Ko-nung in 1955 appeared as a deputy chief of staff, a post which, like his earlier one in foreign affairs, could have been a cover for all the work of the department or for just a part of its security and intelligence functions.

A central control commission, authorized in the party constitution of 1945 as an organ to penalize party members who violated party laws, was finally established in 1955 by the party conference which aired the Kao-Jao case; the commission, which had no power to take action against members of the central committee, was placed under Tung Pi-wu, who had similar posts in the government.

Of considerable interest was the reappearance in 1955 of a party regional bureau for East China, under Ko Ching-shih, who had been associated with many party leaders.

There seemed to be some important changes in the party hierarchy during 1955 which were not directly reflected in organizational changes. The position of the five ranking leaders remained unchanged, with Chu Te formally in fourth place, although apparently with nothing like the power of the others of this inner core. The most striking development was the rise of Teng Hsiao-ping; following his appointment as secretary general in 1954, Teng's role in reporting on the Kao-Jao case in March 1955 strongly suggested that he had displaced Peng Chen as Liu Shao-chi's first lieutenant for party affairs (just as Liu himself had long been Mao's first lieutenant in this area). Peng was apparently being held in some part responsible--whether rightly or wrongly--for the party's sad experience with Kao Kang, who had succeeded Peng as party boss of the Northeast, and/or with Jao Shu-shih, who had probably succeeded Peng as director of the organization department.

A more puzzling development was the apparent decline in the stature of Kang Sheng. Kang's return from Shantung in 1954 had suggested the possibility that he would resume his post as director of the party's security department. He had given an "important speech" at the party conference which aired the Kao-Jao case, and he was listed in sixth place among politburo members at that time. During the rest of 1955, however, Kang sometimes slipped to lower

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positions in official lists of politburo members. Also puzzling was the apparent slighting of Teng Tzu-hui, director of the rural work department, who in 1954 and 1955 had been closer to Mao Tse-tung's final position on the tempo of socialization than had many other party leaders (including Liu Shao-chi), but who nonetheless had been passed over when the time came for an "explanation" of the new line at the 6th plenum. Similarly excluded from a role which might have been expected of him was Chang Wen-tien, the only active member of the politburo who spoke neither to the party conference in March nor to the plenum in October.

Seventh Plenum of Seventh Central Committee, August 1956

The seventh plenum convened in Peiping on 22 August and on 8 and 13 September 1956 to prepare for the imminent eighth party congress. Attending were 44 members and 23 alternate members of the central committee, with many other party members from party and state organs in Peiping and around China attending as observers. The plenum "examined and passed" a number of documents relating to the topics which the sixth plenum had stated as the main agenda items for the eighth congress. These documents, which had clearly been prepared before the seventh plenum convened, were: A political report; a draft of the revised party constitution; a report on that revised constitution; draft proposals for a second five-year plan; and a report on those proposals. The ~~sixth~~ plenum also proposed members for the presidium, secretariat, and credentials committee of the coming congress.

The presidium later elected a standing committee--the body actually to preside over the congress--which consisted of the 13 members of the outgoing politburo, in order of their official rank at the time (the order in which they appear on Chart IV). As the seventh plenum was in effect a part of the eighth congress and made no organizational changes, there is no column representing it on the charts.

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CENTRAL PARTY ORGANS 1956-1961

	Sep. 1956 Eighth Congress	1957	May 1958, 2nd Session Eighth Congress	1959	1960	1961
CENTRAL COMMITTEE Officers						
Chairman: MAO TSE-TUNG						
V. Chair: LIU SHAO-CHI						
V. Chair: CHOU EN-LAI						
V. Chair: CHU TE						
V. Chair: CHEN YUN						
V. Chair: LIN PIAO						
Secy Genl: TENG HSIAO-PING						

POLITBURO

Chairman: MAO TSE-TUNG						
V. Chair: LIU SHAO-CHI						
V. Chair: CHOU EN-LAI						
V. Chair: CHU TE						
V. Chair: CHEN YUN						
V. Chair: LIN PIAO (From 1958)						
TENG HSIAO-PING						
LIN PO-CHU						
TUNG PI-WU						
PENG CHEN						
LO JUNG-HUAN						
CHEN YI						
LI FU-CHUN						
PENG TE-HUAI						
LIU PO-CHENG						
HO LUNG						
LI HSIEN-NIEN						
KO CHING-SHIH						
LI CHING-CHUAN						
TAN CHEN-LIN						
Alternates:						
ULANFU						
CHANG WEN-TIEN						
LU TING-I						
CHEN PO-TA						
KANG SHENG						
PO I-PO						

STANDING COMMITTEE OF POLITBURO

MAO TSE-TUNG						
LIU SHAO-CHI						
CHOU EN-LAI						
CHU TE						
CHEN YUN						
LIN PIAO						
TENG HSIAO-PING						

SECRETARIAT

TENG HSIAO-PING						
PENG CHEN						
LI FU-CHUN						
LI HSIEN-NIEN						
TAN CHEN-LIN						
<u>Wang Chia-hsiang</u>						
<u>Tan Cheng</u>						
<u>Huang Ko-cheng</u>						
<u>Li Hsueh-feng</u>						
Alternates:						
<u>Liu Lan-tao</u>						
<u>Yang Shang-kun</u>						
<u>Hu Chiao-mu</u>						

Current Politburo members in CAPITALS.

Current Central Committee members underlined.

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CENTRAL PARTY ORGANS 1956-1961 (Continued)

CENTRAL DEPARTMENTS

		1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961
Staff Office	Dir: <u>Yang Shang-k'un</u>						
	Dep: Tseng San <u>Li Chieh-po</u>		?				

Organization	Dir: <u>An Tzu-wen</u>	Acting					
	Dep: <u>Ma Ming-fang</u> <u>Shuai Meng-chi</u>		?	To Fin.-Econ. Dept			
			?				

Propaganda	Dir: <u>LU TING-I</u>						
	Dep: <u>CHEN PO-TA</u>	?	?				
	<u>?KANG SHENG</u>	?	?	?			
	<u>Hu Chiao-mu</u>		?	?			
	<u>Chang Chi-chun</u>		?	?			
	<u>Chou Yang</u>						
	<u>Chang Tzu-i</u>			?			
	<u>Hu Sheng</u>						
	<u>Chang Pan-shih</u>						

Social Affairs	Dir:						
	Dep:						

??Judicial??	Dir:						
	Dep:						

Gen'l Political	Dir: <u>Tan Cheng</u>	Acting		?			
	Dep: <u>Kan Szu-chi</u> <u>Hsiao Hua</u> <u>Liu Chih-chien</u>						
			?	?			

United Front	Dir: <u>Li Wei-han</u>						
	Dep: <u>Liao Cheng-chih</u> <u>Liu Ko-ping</u> <u>-Hsu Ping</u> <u>Wang Feng</u> <u>Yu I-fu</u> <u>Ping Chieh-san</u> <u>Chang Chih-i</u> <u>Hsu Ti-hsin</u>		?	?			
			?	To Ninghsia			

??Planning??	Dir: <u>LI FU-CHUN</u>		?				
	Dep:						

Rural Work	Dir: <u>Teng Tzu-hui</u>						
	Dep: <u>Liao Lu-yen</u> <u>Chen Cheng-jen</u> <u>Liu Chien-hsun</u>			?			
		?		To Kiangsi			

Industrial Work	Dir: <u>Li Hsueh-feng</u>						
	Dep: <u>Li Li-san</u>			?			

Current Politburo members in CAPITALS.
Current Central Committee members underlined.

CENTRAL PARTY ORGANS 1956-1961

CENTRAL DEPARTMENTS

		1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961
Finance & Trade	Dir: <u>Ma Ming-fang</u>	?					
	Dep: <u>Pei Meng-fei</u>	?					

Communications	Dir: <u>Tseng Shan</u>						
	Dep: <u>Chang Pang-ying</u>						

Int'l Liaison	Dir: <u>Wang Chia-hsiang</u>	?	?	?			
	Dep:						

OTHER CENTRAL ORGANS

Central Control Commis.	Sec'y: <u>TUNG PI-WU</u>						
	Dep: <u>Liu Lan-tao</u>						
	Dep: <u>Hsiao Hua</u>		?				
	Dep: <u>Wang Tsung-wu</u>						
	Dep: <u>Chien Ying</u>		?				
	Dep: <u>Liu Hsi-wu</u>		?				

Ctte. for CCP Organs Sub.to Cent. Ctte.	Sec'y: <u>Yang Shang-kun</u>	?	?				
	Dep:						
	Dep:						

Ctte. for Central State Organs	Sec'y: <u>Kung Tzu-jung</u>		?				
	Dep:						
	Dep:						

Military Committee	Sec'y: <u>PENG TE-HUAI</u>	?	?	?			
	Dep:						
	Dep:						

Economic Committee??	Sec'y: <u>LI FU-CHUN</u>	?	?	?			
	Dep:						
	Dep:						

Youth Work Committee??	Sec'y: <u>Hu Yao-pang</u>						
	Dep:						
Young Communist League	Sec'y: <u>Hu Yao-pang</u>	ACFDY					

Women's Work Committee	Sec'y: <u>Tsai Chang</u>						
	Dep: <u>Teng Ying-chao</u>						
Women's Federation	Chair: <u>Tsai Chang</u>						

Labor Committee??	Sec'y:						
	Dep:						
Trade Unions Federation	Chair: <u>Lai Jo-yu</u> <u>Liu Ning-i</u>			Died			

Current Politburo members in CAPITALS.
Current Central Committee members underlined.

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Eighth CCP Congress, September 1956

✓ The eighth congress of the CCP met in Peiping to congratulate the party leadership on its unswervingly correct course since the time of Mao's ascendancy, to approve the current policies of Mao and his lieutenants, to confirm Mao and his lieutenants in their domination, and at the same time to make certain organizational changes in preparation for the time when Mao would choose or be obliged to step down.

Mao opened the congress with a brief speech. He observed that the party's line since the seventh congress of 1945 had been correct, but that the party had made some mistakes in implementing it. Foreshadowing the "rectification" campaign of 1957-58, Mao noted the "serious faults" in the party of subjectivism in thinking, bureaucratism in work, and sectarianism in relations with nonparty people.

Liu Shao-chi then delivered a four-hour "political report," the principal address of the congress. That Liu was chosen for this role, which Mao himself had played at the seventh congress, was a further indication of his status as Mao's first lieutenant. The report itself amounted to little more than an endorsement of policies already in effect: for example, the effort to transform China from a backward agricultural to an advanced industrial country as rapidly as practicable, recognizing that this takes "considerable time"; the intention of the party to maintain and strengthen its direction and control of all organs of the state; the view of the party that maintenance of the Sino-Soviet alliance is its "supreme international duty." However, Liu, like Mao, pointed to "serious mistakes" in the thinking of party members which had to be corrected by further intensive education.

Chou En-lai reported on the draft Second Five-Year Plan, which reflected confidence that the rate of growth under the First Five-Year Plan could be maintained, but did not reflect the ebullience of early 1956. Chou foresaw by 1962, as compared with the original (not revised) goals of 1957, a rise of 50 percent in national income, an increase of 100 percent in industrial output, and an increase of 35 percent in agricultural output.

The conclusion of Chou's report can perhaps be read as anticipating that a "leap forward" campaign would be grafted on to the "rectification" campaign launched a few months later, as Chou said that the party would be able to "go forward" if it could rectify subjectivism and bureaucratism. However, contrary to assertions made in 1958, the eighth congress of September 1956 was not a "leap forward" congress. Chou early in 1956 had said that the congress would make its central question that of opposing "rightist conservatism," but much of Chou's September report was concerned with errors of planning which by August had made "leftist adventurism" an equal danger. Liu Shao-chi in his report described the Second Five-Year Plan as standing between conservatism and adventurism, and the plan itself concluded with a warning against both of these dangers.

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Teng Hsiao-ping, speaking between Liu and Chou, reported on the revised party constitution. That he gave this report, which Liu had given at the seventh congress, was a further indication of his status as Liu's first lieutenant for party affairs. Like Mao, Liu, and Chou, Teng implied the coming of "rectification" in his detailed discussion of the need to struggle against subjectivism, bureaucratism, and sectarianism. Teng emphasized the need for more intensive education of those nine out of ten party members (the total membership was then about 10,735,000) who had joined the party since 1945. Teng enlarged on a number of Liu's points about the methods to be used in bringing the party to the desired state.

The new constitution declared that the party took Marxism-Leninism as its "guide to action," deleting the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" in this connection. This, like many pronouncements made by the congress, was a concession to the recent Soviet emphasis on "collective leadership" as opposed to the "cult of the individual."

The constitution specified that the national party congress, nominally the most powerful body of the party, should have a life of five years and should meet every year (as contrasted with a meeting every three years in the 1945 version); however, the central committee might either advance or postpone such meetings. The congress would "hear and examine" reports submitted by the central committee, "decide on" the party's principles and policies, revise the constitution, and elect the central committee. Just as before, the congress in reality would approve actions already taken by party leaders.

The constitution specified that the life of each central committee was also to be five years. As before, the central committee was to "lead all the work of the party" between congresses. Specifically, it was to set up party organs and direct their activities, to direct the work of government organs and mass organizations through the party committees in those bodies, and to direct the work of the general political department, responsible for "ideological and organizational" work in the armed forces. The central committee was to meet in plenary session at least twice a year. The September 1956 congress elected a central committee of 97 full members and 73 alternate (nonvoting) members.

The constitution provided that the central committee in plenary session would elect the politburo (as before) and a new organ, the standing committee of the politburo. The authority to exercise the "functions and powers" of the central committee between plenary sessions--essentially the authority given to the politburo alone by the 1945 constitution--was given jointly to the politburo and its standing committee. Teng Hsiao-ping noted in his report that the politburo standing committee would "play the role of the past central secretariat which has proven necessary and appropriate." In other words, the secretariat named in 1945 had displaced the politburo as the core of party power, and the party now was choosing to recognize and perpetuate this situation by redesignating this body as a standing committee.

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The constitution further provided for the central committee to elect a secretariat, which, as provided in the 1945 constitution, would handle the "daily work" of the central committee. The new secretariat was to be directed in its work by the politburo and the politburo standing committee. In other words, there remained a need for a party secretariat to handle the work appropriate to a secretariat rather than to a super-politburo--the work of administering and coordinating the party apparatus which Teng Hsiao-ping himself had presumably been directing at least since 1954 as the party's secretary general.

The constitution further provided that the central committee was to elect a chairman (as before) and--a new provision--a number of vice chairmen and a secretary general. Whereas under the 1945 constitution the chairman of the central committee was to be concurrently chairman of the politburo and secretariat, the new constitution provided that the chairman and vice chairmen were to be concurrently the same officers of the politburo only. The standing committee was not to have any officers. The constitution did not make clear whether the secretary general was automatically--as would be expected--to be the first officer of the secretariat, although the congress confirmed Teng Hsiao-ping as secretary general and named him as the senior member of the secretariat. The constitution contained a new provision for the central committee to establish, when deemed necessary, "one honorary chairman"--presumably a provision for Mao's possible retirement.

Unlike the 1945 constitution, the 1956 document did not discuss the central departments of the party apart from noting that the central committee had the authority to set them up. Teng Hsiao-ping in his report revealed that, as the original structure of the central committee was no longer adequate for the "heavy work of the party and state," the party had decided to establish "additional central organs." In this connection, the constitution provided that the central committee of the (Communist) Youth League--with 20,000,000 members--was to be "under the leadership" of the CCP central committee; it became in effect, like the general political department, a central department of the CCP central committee.

The constitution confirmed the status of the central control commission, established in 1955, as a body to deal with cases of violation of party laws, discipline, morals, and so on. As previously, these bodies at all levels were to work under the direction of the party committees of those levels.

Following the major reports by Liu, Teng, and Chou, many other CCP leaders made lesser addresses to the congress. Of the other politburo members, Chu Te echoed some earlier themes, Chen Yun spoke on socialist transformation, Tung Pi-wu spoke on the legal system, Lin Po-chu on party history, and Peng Te-huai on military affairs. Four politburo members--Kang Sheng, Peng Chen, Chang Wen-tien, and Lin Piao--made no reported speeches. Also speaking were several persons who held important posts in the party's central departments: Teng Tzu-hui, on rural work; Sung Jen-chiung, on collective leadership; Tsai Chang and Teng Ying-chao,

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on women's work; Tan Cheng, on political work in the armed forces; Li Hsueh-feng, on party work in state-owned industrial enterprises; Chou Yang, on the arts; Li Wei-han, on united front work; Hu Yao-pang, on youth work; Lai Jo-yu, on trade union work; and Li Li-san, on his long history of errors.

There were also speeches by party leaders with key posts in the government: Li Fu-chun, who spoke on planning; Li Hsien-nien, on prices; Po I-po, on the relationship of accumulation to consumption; Chen Yi, on foreign affairs; Lo Jui-ching, on public security work; Chia To-fu, on light industry; Wang Shou-tao, on transport and communications; Huang Ching, on the machine building industry; Wang Ho-shou, on metallurgical industries; and Teng Tai-yuan, on railways. Addresses were also made by several of the first secretaries of party bureaus and committees of regions and provinces: Ulanfu of Inner Mongolia, Ko Ching-shih of East China, Li Ching-chuan of Szechuan, Tao Chu of Kwangtung, Lin Tieh of Hopei, Wang Jen-chung of Hupei, Chiang Hua of Chekiang, Kao Feng of Tsinghai, and Chang Kuo-hua of Tibet.

The first plenum of the new (eighth) central committee convened immediately after the congress to elect its officers and the members of the most important central organs--the politburo, the politburo standing committee, and the secretariat. Mao Tse-tung was confirmed as chairman of the central committee (and concurrently of the politburo), and Teng Hsiao-ping as secretary general. Mao's four ranking lieutenants--Liu, Chou, Chu, and Chen Yun--were named vice-chairmen of the central committee (concurrently of the politburo).

The first plenum re-elected as full members of the politburo 11 of the 13 members of the outgoing politburo--the six party leaders (see above) elected as officers of the central committee, plus Lin Piao, Lin Po-chu, Tung Pi-wu, Peng Chen, and Peng Tehuai. Two full members of the outgoing politburo--Kang Sheng and Chang Wen-tien--were named to the new politburo but demoted to alternate (nonvoting) members. Six party leaders were named to the politburo for the first time, all as full members: Lo Jung-huan, director of the general political department; Chen Yi, who was becoming Chou En-lai's understudy in foreign affairs; Li Fu-chun, the specialist in long-range economic planning; Liu Po-cheng, commander of the military academy at Nanking; Ho Lung, like Chen Yi a utility man for Chou En-lai but a less important one; and Li Hsien-nien, the specialist in finance. Also named to the politburo for the first time, but as alternate rather than full members were: Ulanfu, the party boss of Inner Mongolia and a specialist in the affairs of national minorities; Lu Ting-i, director of the propaganda department; Chen Po-ta, Mao Tse-tung's long-time spokesman who may at the time have been a deputy director of both the propaganda department and the rural work department; and Po I-po, the specialist in annual economic planning.

The first plenum named as the members of the new politburo standing committee--the equivalent of the former secretariat--the five party leaders known to have been members of the former secretariat and the one (Teng) believed to have been added a year or two earlier. These were the same six persons--Mao, Liu, Chou, Chu, Chen, and Teng--earlier elected as the six officers of the new central committee.

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Named to the new secretariat as full members were: Teng Hsiao-ping, the party's secretary general, who thus became the only person to be concurrently a member of the party's three most important central organs--the politburo, its standing committee, and the secretariat; Peng Chen, the politburo member who had apparently been displaced by Teng in 1954 as Liu Shao-chi's first lieutenant; Wang Chia-hsiang, the second-ranking deputy minister of foreign affairs; Tan Chen-lin, who had been a deputy secretary general; Tan Cheng, deputy director of the general political department; Huang Ko-cheng, the top-ranking military man of the deputy chiefs of staff; and Li Hsueh-feng, director of the party's new industrial and communications work department. Named as alternate secretaries were Liu Lan-tao and Yang Shang-kun, each of whom had been a deputy secretary general, and Hu Chiao-mu, a deputy director of the propaganda department.

The first plenum also elected the members and officers of the comparatively unimportant central control commission. Tung Pi-wu of the politburo was confirmed as the secretary of this body. Named as deputies were: Liu Lan-tao, who had just been named an alternate secretary of the secretariat; Hsiao Hua, a deputy director of the general political department; Wang Tsung-wu, a party functionary who had worked in North China with Teng Hsiao-ping and Po I-po; Chien Ying, the regime's minister of supervision; and Liu Hsi-wu, a party worker from the Northeast.

The eighth congress confirmed the status of several of the party's top leaders and indicated changes in the status of others. Mao, Liu, and Chou clearly remained first, second, and third. Chu Te remained formally fourth but, in comparison with other party officers, an unimportant figure. Chen Yun remained in fifth place, although probably overtaken in terms of real power by Teng Hsiao-ping. Teng emerged clearly as one of the top five, perhaps fourth in power. Of the other seven members of the precongress politburo, three comparatively unimportant figures--the elderly Lin Po-chu and Tung Pi-wu and the sick Lin Piao--had retained or improved their formal standing without becoming any more important; two, Peng Chen and Peng Te-huai, declined slightly in formal standing but remained key figures; and two, Kang Sheng and Chang Wen-tien, had clearly been demoted, perhaps out of the top leadership.

Of the six full members of the politburo added by the congress, two were clearly key figures, the economic specialists Li Fu-chun and Li Hsien-nien. However, the other four--Lo Jung-huan, Chen Yi, Liu Po-cheng and Ho Lung--were not active in key positions, and at least three of them were apparently being rewarded for their services as military leaders before the Peiping regime was established. Of the six persons named by the congress as alternate members of the politburo, two--Chang Wen-tien and Kang Sheng--had been demoted from full membership whereas the other four were all being promoted in the hierarchy.

A minor puzzle was Po I-po's election as an alternate rather than full member of the politburo, as he seemed just as important a figure as the economists named as new full members; it may have been because Po had been less strongly associated with Mao's position of high confidence in economic matters in early 1956 than had Li Fu-chun.

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and Li Hsien-nien. This was almost certainly the reason why Tong Tzu-hui, the specialist in rural work, failed to make the politburo; Teng at the congress revealed that he had been a leader of the "rightist conservative" group opposed to Mao's position in the latter part of 1955. There were a few other persons whose positions in the regime were sufficiently important to seem to justify adding them as alternate if not full members of the politburo, but who were passed over: for example, Su Yu, the apparently very able chief of staff, and Lo Jui-ching, the public security chief.

Second Plenum of Eighth Central Committee, November 1956

The second plenum of the CCP's eighth central committee convened less than two months after the committee had been elected by the first plenum--to hear reports on the international situation and certain domestic economic questions. In calling this plenum so soon, the party leaders were probably impelled both by fast-moving developments in Eastern Europe and the Middle East and by their consciousness that the central committee had met too infrequently in the past. Although none of the reports to the plenum was published, Peiping provided a brief summary of them.

Liu Shao-chi reported on the "present situation"--defined as developments relating to Egypt, Hungary, and Poland. According to Peiping's summary, the emphasis in Liu's report was on the need to "resolutely strengthen" the solidarity of the bloc countries with the USSR at their head. This emphasis, characteristic of Liu, was also the emphasis of Peiping's very elaborate statement of 29 December 1956--a statement based on the discussion at an enlarged meeting of the CCP politburo--on problems in intrabloc relations.

Chou En-lai reported to the plenum on economic planning for 1956 and 1957. Reflecting the troubles which had become apparent earlier in the year, Chou noted that certain features of planning for 1956 had been "carried out improperly" and that "certain expenses had been rather excessive." Chou called for an "appropriate retrenchment" in the 1957 planning and "great efforts" for economy in state organs.

Chen Yun reported on measures to improve the work of purchase and sale of grain and to increase the production of some agricultural items. Chen's report presumably reflected the party's increasing recognition of the need for a more ambitious agricultural program--a theme which became strong several months later.

Mao Tse-tung made a summary speech. According to the summary of the summary, Mao reiterated the party leadership's intention to launch a campaign against "subjectivism, sectarianism and bureaucracy" in the party. He also called for the party "resolutely to oppose great-power chauvinism" in international relations. This theme, an indirect criticism of Soviet behavior and perhaps more congenial to Mao than to Liu, was also developed in the 29 December statement on intrabloc relations.

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The 2nd plenum announced no changes in the party's central organs. However, certain changes came to light on both sides of the plenum. An Tzu-wen was identified as acting director of the organization department. Tan Cheng, who had probably been acting as director of the general political department for some time, officially replaced Lo Jung-huan as director of this department in December 1956. Li Hsueh-feng, who had been associated with several party leaders--including Teng Hsiao-ping and Li Hsien-nien of the politburo, and Tan Cheng of the secretariat--was identified as director of a new industrial and communications work department, apparently concerned with party work in state-owned industry and transport; the much-assailed Li Li-san was identified as deputy. Tseng San, an apparent protégé of Yang Shang-kun, was identified as deputy director under Yang of the central committee's staff office. Tsai Chang and Teng Ying-chao apparently became active again with the women's work committee.

Third Plenum of Eighth Central Committee, September-October 1957

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The third plenum met in Peiping during a period in which Mao Tse-tung was making a recovery from certain mistakes of the previous two years. The process of recovery had begun in June, with the publication of an official--much revised-- version of Mao's speech on "contradictions" in February 1957; and the pronouncements made at and by the third plenum contributed to the process.

Mao's mistakes had related to his incitement of the campaign against "rightist conservatism" in production and construction in the winter of 1955-56, his insistence on the "hundred flowers" policy of domestic liberalization from early 1956 to mid-1957, and his advocacy of a comparatively liberal line in intrabloc relations from autumn 1956 to mid-1957. The first of these mistakes--the rush forward without proper planning--had led to the dislocations of the Chinese economy which had forced a "retrenchment" in 1957. The second had inspired the fervent attacks on the CCP's monopoly of power and its basic policies in the spring of 1957, and had increased rather than resolved the party's problems with the intellectuals. The third, presenting a thesis which had been seized on and exaggerated by anti-Soviet forces in Eastern Europe, had increased the Kremlin's troubles in that area.

The June 1957 official version of Mao's February speech had strongly reaffirmed orthodox positions--for the benefit of Mao's Eastern European as well as Chinese audience--and had cut off fundamental criticism of Mao's regime. Moreover, Mao in July (according to a later statement) had laid down the lines for a nationwide "rectification" campaign--that is, a merging of the "rectification" campaign in the CCP which had been under way since May and the party-directed "antirightist" campaign under way since June. Announcement of this merger had been made in early September, but there remained a need for a top-level explication of it. Similarly, Mao in June had linked "rectification" with the task of "socialistic construction," and the party

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press had stated in early September that the party's principal problem in 1958 would be the development of agriculture, but there was a need for a further affirmation of a more aggressive program than the planning of 1957. In the same way, the CCP had refrained from encouraging unorthodoxy elsewhere in the Communist world since early 1957, but there remained a need for an unmistakable statement of the CCP's recent retreat from liberalization internationally as well as domestically.

The principal report to the third plenum was given by Teng Hsiao-ping, on the "nationwide rectification movement." Teng stated in detail the party's plans for thoroughly indoctrinating the populace--in the guise of a "great national debate"--in orthodox Communist dogmas which were henceforth not to be questioned. Teng also noted that the "great debate" in the countryside would be followed by another on production and construction to "give an impetus to an upsurge" in agriculture during the winter, and that the party must "constantly struggle against rightist conservative ideology." Teng thus foreshadowed the 1958 campaign for a "giant leap forward" in economic progress.

Teng also spoke at length about measures for correcting the principal vices of party members as defined by Mao and Teng in September 1956 and thereafter formalized in the party's "rectification" movement. Subjectivism, bureaucratism, and sectarianism were to be corrected by acceptance of criticism, by decreasing the distance between party members and the masses, and by readjusting relations between party and government and between upper and lower levels--such readjustment to include some streamlining and some decentralization.

Chen Yun reported to the third plenum on the improvement of the state administrative system and the development of agriculture. The text of his speech was not released, but it probably in large part concerned plans for decentralization, which (as Teng had noted) was a part of "rectification" and came to be an important part of the "giant leap forward" of 1958. Three directives on decentralization were published a few weeks after Chen spoke.

The third major report was by Chou En-lai, on wages, labor insurance, and related matters. This text was not published either. Chou presumably argued for holding the line on these matters, to avoid repeating some mistakes of extravagance made in 1956.

The third plenum passed a revised draft of the 12-year program (1956-67) for the development of agriculture, and draft regulations relating to other matters discussed by Teng, Chen, and Chou. Shortly thereafter, Tan Chen-lin of the secretariat reported publicly on the draft agricultural program, and after some further revisions the regime published it. Although certain grandiose goals of the first draft of early 1956 had been omitted, the October 1957 version was still extremely ambitious.

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Shortly after the third plenum, Mao himself took further action to make clear his position--i.e., his position since June 1957--on intrabloc relations. Taking Teng Hsiao-ping with him to Moscow, Mao at the Moscow meeting of Communist parties stated the hardest Chinese line on this question since Liu Shao-chi's remarks on Titoism in 1948. Mao said that the bloc's "urgent" task was to oppose "revisionist deviation," that maintenance of bloc unity was the "sacred obligation" of Communist states, and that the Soviet party must act as the leader of other parties.

During 1957, the positions of party leaders showed little apparent change. Mao's position may have declined a bit, owing to illness and past errors in judgment, but he clearly continued to dominate the party. Liu Shao-chi remained in second place, and was increasingly given the special treatment in the Chinese press ordinarily reserved for Mao. Chou En-lai stayed third, remaining very active despite hints of illness. Chen Yun was less publicly active than usual, and was suspected of having lost some of his influence, but remained in favor. Teng Hsiao-ping continued to prosper greatly, playing an increasingly important role. Peng Chen and the military leader Peng Te-huai remained key figures, although at a somewhat lower level of prestige than the five cited above. Li Fu-chun and Li Hsien-nien of the other full members of the politburo, and alternate member Po I-po, the three ranking economists below Chen Yun, remained active and in good favor. These ten persons seemed to constitute the top handful of party leaders. The other eight full members of the politburo--Chu Te, Lin Piao, Lin Po-chu, Tung Pi-wu, Lo Jung-huan, Chen Yi, Liu Po-cheng, and Ho Lung--were so little active or active in such small roles in 1957 as to appear to justify their continued classification as relatively unimportant figures.

Certain changes in the party's central organs came to light during 1957. An Tzu-wen was elevated from acting director to director of the organization department. Chang Tzu-i, one of Teng Hsiao-ping's onetime lieutenants in the Southwest, was added to the propaganda department as a deputy director; and another of Teng's protégés, Chang Chi-chun, who had earlier become a deputy in this department, became concurrently acting director of the State Council's second staff office, concerned with education, culture, and public information. The propaganda department may also have added as a deputy director Kang Sheng, the alternate member of the politburo who was appearing increasingly in propaganda roles. The director of the social affairs (security) department remained highly uncertain. Teng Tzu-hui remained director of the rural work department, although displaced by Tan Chen-lin of the secretariat as the party's principal spokesman for rural work. The industrial and communications work department, under Li Hsueh-feng, split into two--an industrial work department, under Li, and a communications work department under Tseng Shan

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Three new committees of the CCP central committee emerged in 1957. These were the committee for organs directly subordinate to the central committee, the committee for central state organs, and the military committee. Their character was not clear.

Second Session of Eighth CCP Congress, May 1958

The second session of the party's eighth congress should properly have been convened during 1957, but various developments in intrabloc relations and Chinese internal affairs impelled a postponement. The session met in Peiping in May 1958, following the fourth plenum of the eighth central committee, which adopted the reports to be delivered to the congress.

Following the November 1957 meeting in Moscow of Communist parties, Peiping had offered thinly disguised admonitions to Belgrade. The Chinese had refrained from invective, however, apparently in the hope that Moscow would be successful in its "comradely" efforts to induce the Yugoslavs to revise their party program. When the Soviet failure became clear, the CCP in early May erupted in a scalding attack on the entire Yugoslav program. In so doing, the CCP was following a Soviet lead, although the harshness of Peiping's tone occasioned speculation that the Chinese were trying to force the Russians into a harder position than Moscow wished. The difference in tone may have been primarily a reflection of the threat of "revisionism" in China itself.

"Rectification" in Communist China had proceeded more or less smoothly, although not as rapidly as planned, along the lines laid out by Teng Hsiao-ping in September 1957. In the last few months of 1957 and the early months of 1958, the party had been concerned primarily with grafting on to the "rectification" campaign another campaign for a "giant leap forward" in economic development. That is, with the assurance of a good harvest and the rebuilding of inventories, the CCP in autumn 1957 had chosen to return to Mao Tse-tung's anticonservative line (then premature) of late 1955 and early 1956. Beginning in September 1957 with Teng's report on "rectification," many of Mao's lieutenants spoke publicly in favor of a more rapid pace of economic development. Liu Shao-chi, Chou En-lai, Chu Te, Li Fu-chun, Li Hsien-nien, Po I-po, Lu Ting-i, and Chen Po-ta of the politburo, Tan Chen-lin of the secretariat, and Ko Ching-shih of the East China bureau were all strongly associated with the anticonservative line in economic planning by the time of the second session of the eighth congress. Moreover, according to statements made at the congress, the party had held at least two national party conferences in the early months of 1958 to make arrangements for the "giant leap forward." Almost all of the key figures of the politburo, and some other party leaders who were soon officially to join the inner circle, had spent much of the spring of 1958 traveling about China preparing for the "leap."

The most important report to the May 1958 party congress--summarizing the party's situation, general line, and tasks--was made by Liu Shao-chi. The other two major reports were given by Teng Hsiao-ping--on intrabloc relations--and by Teng's deputy, Tan Chen-lin--on agricultural development. Mao himself did not

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make a major report, apparently limiting his role to setting the tone for the congress. However, the speakers credited Mao personally with originating the main policies which were to guide the party for the next year.

Liu began his report from the proposition stated by Mao in Moscow the previous November: that the world situation had reached a "new turning point" in which the "east wind had prevailed over the west wind." Liu reviewed the world scene in these terms, and denounced "modern revisionism" everywhere. He hailed the results of "rectification" in China, including the purging of "rightists" from the CCP. (The congress rebuked as rightists three alternate members of the CCP central committee.) Liu predicted "prolonged and repeated struggles" against Chinese rightists.

Liu went on to say that rectification had made possible the "leap forward on every front of our socialist construction." Liu asserted that Mao and the central committee had "always" favored the "way of working faster and better." Liu observed that many skeptics had been converted, but "some" remained unrepentant and were waiting to "settle accounts" after the fall harvest. Liu reviewed the "U-shaped development" of production and construction in the 1956-58 period: an upsurge in 1956, an ebb in 1957, and a "big leap" in 1958. After stating the basic points of the party's general line, Liu noted that the tempo of economic progress had all along been the "most important question" facing the party. He went on to defend the party's program of developing industry and agriculture simultaneously with priority to heavy industry and of developing simultaneously national and local industries and large, medium-size, and small enterprises. Inter alia, Liu declared that production results to date had already refuted the Malthusians.

Liu pleaded for a special effort in 1958, the first of three years of "hard struggle," partly because "everybody is watching." Party committees at all levels were to take the lead in the "leap." Liu concluded with a call for a "host of people who think, speak, and act with courage and daring...to make innovations and create new things..., conquer ever new positions for the truth..." Within a short historical period, Liu said, China would leave "every capitalist country...far behind."

Teng Hsiao-ping's subject was the Moscow meeting of Communist parties in November 1957. According to Peiping's summary of Teng's report, which was not published, Teng spoke along the lines of the People's Daily attack on Yugoslavia on 5 May 1958. He hailed the declaration adopted by the 12 parties in November, "repudiated the fallacies of modern revisionism" as embodied in the Yugoslav party program, and called for strengthening the solidarity of the "socialist camp headed by the USSR" and waging a resolute struggle against modern revisionism. The congress adopted a resolution condemning Yugoslavia in terms even more harsh than those used before the congress.

Tan Chen-lin in his report on agriculture followed Liu Shao-chi's tactics of insisting that the anticonservatives had been right all along. He defended the grandiose draft plan of January 1956, blaming the troubles of 1957 on those who had pretended to be opposing a "reckless advance." Lest his audience think that the U-shaped

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development of 1956-58 described by Liu was to represent future policy, Tan called this "a bad thing," useful only to show the people the need for moving ahead consistently for "greater, faster, better, and more economical results." Tan explained the second revised draft program for agricultural development, which the congress approved "in principle."

Some 117 persons were said by Peiping to have spoken at "plenary meetings" held during the congress. Those identified as speaking--in addition to Mao, Liu, Teng, and Tan--were Chou En-lai, Chu Te, Chen Yun, Chen Yi, and Li Hsien-nien among the full members of the politburo, all six of the alternate members of the politburo, and Wang Chia-hsiang and Li Hsueh-feng of the secretariat.

Fifth Plenum of Eighth Central Committee, May 1958

The fifth plenary session of the eighth central committee met on 25 May, two days after the congress closed, to make certain changes in the central party organs.

One officer was added to the central committee and politburo: Lin Piao, as fifth-ranking of five vice chairmen. Lin was also named to the politburo standing committee. It was not clear whether Lin's appointment, after six years of severe illness, reflected a belief that he might soon die or, instead, an improvement in his condition to the point that he might be capable of restricted activity. If the latter, it seemed possible that there would be some conflict between Lin and Peng Te-huai, the regime's most important active military leader whose relations with Lin in the 1930's were reportedly poor. ILLEGIB

Three party leaders were added to the politburo, each as a full member. In order of rank, they were: Ko Ching-shih, first secretary of the Shanghai (East China) bureau, who had played an important role in the development of "rectification" and the "leap forward"; Li Ching-chuan, first secretary of the Szechuan provincial committee, who made an unprecedented leap to the politburo from a provincial post without having played an important public role in a major campaign; and Tan Chen-lin, who for a year had been the party's principal spokesman on agriculture and rural work.

Two politburo members were added to the secretariat. These, presumably ranking third and fourth behind Teng Hsiao-ping and Peng Chen, were Li Fu-chun and Li Hsien-nien. The two Li's, who had played important roles in the development of the "leap forward," were apparently added to improve the secretariat's capabilities for coordinating the party's complex work in their fields of long-range planning (Li Fu-chun) and finance, commerce, and trade (Li Hsien-nien).

The 25 May session advanced two alternate members of the central committee to full membership, replacing two deceased members. The congress had earlier named 25 additional alternate members of the central committee. Finally, the 25 May session "decided to publish" a biweekly theoretical journal, Red Flag, under the editorship of politburo member Chen Po-ta.

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Like the other proceedings of the congress--that is, the identity of the major speakers and the content of their speeches--the new appointments at the politburo level reflected both the continuing predominance of Mao and the increasing strength of Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping. Lin Piao had long been known as a favorite of Mao. Ko Ching-shih had been close to both Liu and Teng, and in early 1958 was selected by Mao as a traveling companion. Li Ching-chuan had been one of Teng's top lieutenants when Teng was party boss of the Southwest before 1952, and in early 1958 had also been one of Mao's traveling companions. Tan Chen-lin had begun as a protégé of Mao, and in recent years had been a deputy of Teng's.

Sixth Plenum of 8th CentCtte, Dec '58:

Held in Wuchang, 28 Nov - 10 Dec 1958, "under the guidance of Comrade Mao Tse-tung." Attended by 84 members of CentCtte, including all 20 full members of politburo (listed in official order), 82-alternates, leaders of CentCtte departments, and first secretaries of ~~provincial~~ geographic offices. Sixth plenum was preceded by two meetings, called by Mao, in Chengchow and Wuchang.

"Main items" on agenda were: "people's communes, national economic plan for 1959, and question of not nominating Comrade Mao Tse-tung as Chairman CPC for next term. Plenum also discussed "question of improving financial & trade administrative systems in rural areas, and the international situation." Mao made "important speeches." ILLEGIB

Plenum passed resolution on communes, which "made a very high evaluation of the movement..." Resolution "elaborated on a series of questions" related to communes, and "called upon party committees of the various levels to make best use of next five months from December this year to ~~April~~ next ~~year~~ April to tidy up and consolidate the people's communes in their own areas in close coordination with production tasks for this winter and coming spring."

Plenum reviewed economic growth of '58 and "laid down principles for development of national economy in 1959." (Communique used figures official at time, summarized them as "unprecedentedly great successes.") Plenum described "great leap forward" of 1958, "great rise in socialist communist consciousness of the masses," and development of "communes" as great victories for party's general line and "rich fruit of rectification campaign." Plenum (in communique) argued that it is necessary in '59 plan "to continue to oppose conservatism" and at same time "to endeavor to put economic planning on a completely reliable basis..." Having said this, plenum decided on following targets for '59: steel ~~from~~ increased from 11 to 18 million tons; coal from 270 to 380 million tons; grain from 375 to 525 million tons; cotton from 3.35 to 5 million tons. The 1959 plan is to be worked out by ~~selected~~ "departments responsible" (party's central departments?) and submitted to NPC. Plenum affirmed that in order to carry out '59 plan "it is necessary to persist in putting politics in command..."

"After full and all-around consideration," the 6th plenum "decided to approve the suggestion put forward by Comrade Mao Tse-tung that he not stand for Chairman of the BRC for the next term of office." In working solely as chairman of CentCtte, Mao "will be enabled all the better to concentrate his energies on dealing with questions of direction, policy and line of party and state; he also will be able to set aside more time for Marxist-Leninist theoretical work..." ILLEGIB

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Seventh Plenum of 8th CentCtte, April 2-6:

Held in Shanghai, 2-6 April, following expanded (enlarged) meeting of politburo which laid "groundwork." Plenum discussed and adopted 1959 economic plan, reviewed "work of streamlining people's communes in rural areas," and decided on nominations for leading posts in state organs.

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Draft 1959 economic plan adopted as outlined at sixth plenum last December--18 million tons steel, 380 million tons coal, 825 million tons grain; 5 million tons cotton.

In re communes, plenum held that "work of streamlining and strengthening people's communes has been properly carried out with successful achievements during past three months..." Plenum conducted further study on questions coming to light in recent months.

Plenum was "presided over by Comrade Mao Tse-tung," who "delivered an important speech regarding work methods..." 31 full members and 80 alternate members of CentCtte attended, along with "responsible comrades" from various departments of central government (?) and 1st secretaries of provincial-municipal-autonomous levels.

Eighth Plenum of 8th CentCtte, August 1959:

Held at Lushan, Kiangsi; 2-16 August, "under guidance of Comrade Mao Tse-tung"; 75 members, 74 alternates attended, plus 14 other party officials.

Plenum reviewed 1959 economic plan, discussed economic situation, set forth task of fulfilling in '59 major targets of 2nd FYP ending '62 ((i.e., resurrected old goals to save face for abandoning extreme targets adopted at seventh plenum above)).

Plenum revealed gross "overassessment" of agricultural production in 1958, stated true figure for grain of 250 million tons (375 million had been claimed), for cotton 2,100,000 tons (3,550,000 had been claimed); also conceded backyard steel program unsuccessful.

Plenum drastically reduced 1959 targets: steel, 12 million tons (from 18); coal, 335 million tons (from 380); grain, and cotton, each about 10% over verified 1958 output (i.e., cut to 275 million tons for grain, to 2,510,000 tons for cotton). Plenum took note that people's communes "now advancing along path of consolidated and sound development."

Plenum communique went on to note that "principal danger now confronting achievement of continued leap forward this year is the appearance of right opportunist ideas among some cadres," who "do not try their best" and "overemphasize the seriousness of certain defects" in the Leap and the communes program.


In addition to communique abstracted above, plenum published CentCtte resolution on developing the campaign for increasing production and practising economy--resolution adopted 16 August. Added some detail on communes in re alia that "at present stage a three-level ownership of means of production should be applied in people's communes: ownership at production brigade level constitutes basic one." (See separate analysis.)

Resolution affirmed that party achieved "great victories" in 1957 and first half 1958 "precisely" because strengthened leading role of party, firmly put politics in command, adhered to mass line, and firmly upheld general line, great leap forward, and people's communes.

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COMMUNIST CHINA CONJECTURED LINES OF PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY

September 1958



Current Politburo members in CAPITALS.
Current Central Committee members underlined.

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Current Status of CCP Central OrgansMao's Position

As of September 1958, Mao Tse-tung clearly continues to dominate the CCP, exalted still a considerable distance above even the closest of his lieutenants. The tarnish left by his mistakes of 1955-57 has been removed, and his health, if not as good as it was in 1956, is apparently better than it was in 1957 and early 1958.

Even in mid-1957, when Mao might have been vulnerable to a concerted effort to bring him down (in the sense of inducing him to retire), there was no evidence of such an effort by any important group of his lieutenants. On the contrary, after Mao took the lead in attempting to correct (or in some instances to conceal) his past mistakes, his lieutenants helped him to do so. They have continued to praise him for his role in resolving problems in intrabloc relations, without mentioning those features of Mao's line of 1956-57 which exacerbated those problems. They have hailed the results of the "antirightist" campaign without noting that Mao's "hundred flowers" policy and its reversal left the party in a worse position than before with respect to enlisting the intellectuals. They have extolled Mao for his insistence on an anticonservative line in economic planning despite the fact that this line led to serious troubles in 1957 and the fact that Mao himself agreed to a retreat from the line when the troubles became apparent.

✓ In 1957 and early 1958, the only group in the politburo from which effective opposition to Mao might conceivably have come--the leaders around Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping--chose to associate itself emphatically with the most hazardous of Mao's policies--the campaign for a "giant leap forward." In so doing, this group undercut any possible effort on its part to unseat Mao for the failure of the program. In any case, the "leap" is X apparently going to succeed--not in reaching all of its very ambitious and in some respects incredible goals, but in reaching enough of its principal objectives to qualify as a major success. It is the progress of the "leap" to date which, more than any other consideration, has seemed to serve to restore to Mao whatever prestige he may have lost in 1956-57.

There is no solid information on Mao's health, and his forced retirement on these grounds remains possible. However, judging from the Chinese press, he has not been as easily fatigued in recent months as he was in 1957 and early 1958. It may be that Mao regards himself as strong enough to continue as the party chairman at least until the party's ninth congress in 1961--which will coincide with the 40th anniversary of the CCP and could provide a good occasion for Mao, after 26 years of domination of the party, to step aside and become the "honorary chairman." *

Central Committee

The CCP central committee as a body, with 97 full members and 95 alternates, has not yet functioned as anything more than

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a rubber stamp. This is not necessarily the committee's permanent status. As has apparently been the case on at least one occasion in the Soviet party, an issue on which party leaders on the politburo are seriously or critically divided could be referred to the central committee as a whole. For the time being, however, the composition of the CCP central committee is of interest chiefly in indicating the positions and persons regarded by the party leadership as particularly important. Of the current full members, the largest number are important primarily as party workers, with smaller numbers important as joint party-government workers, government figures, and military leaders.

Politburo

The CCP politburo as a body is probably still of considerable importance both as a discussion group and as a voting body, and with respect both to major policies and to top-level appointments. Mao can still afford to allow the politburo to operate freely as a discussing and voting organ, because it is still responsive to him.

Considering the politburo as a discussion group, the alternate members are just as important as many of the full members, and more important than some. The principal areas of concern, and the politburo members with competence in these areas, are roughly as follows: general affairs, i.e., the full range of the party's concern--Mao and Liu Shao-chi, and possibly Chou En-lai; the work and state of health of the party machine--Liu, Teng Hsiao-ping, and Peng Chen; government work of all kinds--Chou En-lai and Chen Yun; military affairs--Chu Te, Lin Piao, Peng Te-huai, Liu Po-cheng, and Ho Lung; political control of the military--Teng Hsiao-ping, Lo Jung-huan, Tan Chen-lin, Kang Sheng, and others (more than half of the politburo members have been political officers); economic affairs--Chen Yun, Li Fu-chun, Li Hsien-nien, Tan Chen-lin, and Po I-po; foreign affairs--Chou En-lai, Chen Yi, and Chang Wen-tien; intrabloc relations--Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping, and Peng Chen; party security and public security work--Teng Hsiao-ping and Kang Sheng; propaganda and theory--Lu Ting-i, Chen Po-ta, and Kang Sheng; and party work of all kinds in the regional administrations--Ko Ching-shih, Li Ching-chuan, and Ulanfu.

Considering the politburo as a voting body, only the 20 full members are important, as only they vote. It seems very probable that most of these 20 vote with Mao on any matter on which he has made his position known. Apart from this probability, Mao seems to have at least five "automatic" votes in addition to his own: Those of Chu Te, Lin Piao, Lin Po-chu, and Tung Pi-wu, who are not strong figures in their own right, and that of Peng Te-huai, who since the May congress has continued to play an important role in Peiping's affairs. Peng still appears to be a center of power, and since the May congress he has moved up in the official listings of politburo members until he now ranks sixth among the key figures, just ahead of Peng Chen.

Nobody else seems to have any "automatic" votes, except his own. There are six full members of the politburo, however, who

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may in a loose sense constitute a group within the politburo. These "organizational" figures--so designated because their importance lies primarily in the party machine--are Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping, Peng Chen, and the three newest members, Ko Ching-shih, Li Ching-chuan, and Tan Chen-lin. Liu and Peng are known to have been close to Mao for many years, Teng has been close in recent years, Tan has apparently again become close to Mao in the past two years, and Ko and Li seem to have become close to Mao in the past year or so. However, these six party leaders have similar backgrounds, have been closely associated with one another in party work, and seem to have similar predispositions, which might conceivably impel them to oppose Mao as a group on some critical issue, and which in any case might dispose them to act as a group in the post-Mao party leadership.

Liu and Teng have made many appearances since the May congress, and have been cited affectionately in the party press as "Comrade Shao-chi" and "Comrade Hsiao-ping." Peng Chen has slipped a little in the hierarchy, being overtaken by Peng Tehuai, but seems still in favor. Tan Chen-lin has played an increasingly important role in the "giant leap forward," and recently got second billing only to Mao in Peiping's account of reports given to a public forum. Ko Ching-shih has appeared frequently. Li Ching-chuan's activities have not been reported.

There are five other full members of the politburo whose close association for many years may qualify them as a group in the same loose sense as the Liu-Teng group noted above. These are Chou En-lai, Chen Yun, Chen Yi, Li Fu-chun, and Ho Lung. Chou lost no stature in relinquishing the Foreign Ministry to Chen Yi in early 1958; he has been very active, has received considerable personal publicity of the type given Mao and Liu Shao-chi (although not as much as Liu), and clearly remains third in the hierarchy. Chen Yun has not played much of a public role since the May congress, but seems still in favor. Chen Yi has been active as a spokesman for Chou, and Ho Lung has continued as a relatively unimportant utility man.

The other three full members of the politburo--Lo Jung-huan, Liu Po-cheng, and Li Hsien-nien--do not seem to qualify as members of any group even in a loose sense. Lo and Liu have remained comparatively inactive, while Li has continued to play a role in the "leap forward."

Politburo Standing Committee

The major policies of the party, and top-level appointments in the party and government machines, probably originate much more often in the politburo standing committee than in the politburo as a body. It is also very probable that the politburo standing committee rather than the full politburo exercises active supervision of the secretariat and thus of the party machine as a whole; and of the State Council and thus of the government machine, the latter including the military establishment subordinate to the Ministry of Defense.

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The seven-man standing committee of the politburo can credibly be divided into four units: The leader--Mao Tse-tung--off by himself; two venerated but comparatively unimportant figures--Chu Te and Lin Piao--who can be regarded as appendages or appendices to the leader; two powerful lieutenants--Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping--concerned primarily with party matters; and two lieutenants--Chou En-lai and Chen Yun--less powerful as a team, concerned primarily with government matters. In devising the major policies of the regime, which affect equally the areas of concern of Liu and Teng on one hand and of Chou and Chen on the other, Mao presumably works with the four of them as a group. Should it ever be necessary to vote on a policy inside the politburo standing committee, Mao has two "automatic" votes in Chu and Lin in addition to his own, so that all four of the other members would have to unite against him--an unlikely event.

The initiative for appointments to top level party posts, when it is not taken by Mao himself, very probably comes primarily from Liu and Teng, and for government posts from Chou and Chen. Reporting to Mao on the work of the party machine seems primarily the responsibility of Liu and Teng, and, on the work of the government machine, of Chou and Chen. Similarly, responsibility for supervising the work of the party machine is given by Mao primarily to Liu and Teng, and, of the government machine, to Chou and Chen; in this connection, supervision of the work of party organs in the government would be exercised primarily by Liu and Teng, not by Chou and Chen. Chu Te and Lin Piao, as senior military men, presumably offer counsel on military policies and appointments, but there is no evidence that they have direct responsibility for military matters in anything like the way that Liu and Teng have responsibility for party matters and Chou and Chen for government matters. While Chou and Chen can answer for the military establishment (apart from party work in the military), it seems likely that Mao often deals directly with Peng Te-huai, the key military figure as minister of defense. ILLEGIB

Secretariat

Directed jointly by the politburo and its standing committee under the terms of the party constitution, supervised in practice primarily by Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping of the politburo standing committee, the party secretariat is directed primarily by Teng Hsiao-ping. It is still not clear whether Teng as secretary general of the party's central committee and senior secretary of the secretariat holds two posts here or just one, i.e., whether the secretary general is the formal title of the senior secretary of the secretariat; but in either case Teng is the principal officer of this body. As such, Teng has over-all responsibility for the secretariat's work of transmitting politburo decisions, formulating measures for implementing those decisions, and directing and coordinating the work of the party's subordinate central organs, which are concerned in part with defining "principles and policies" for government organs and supervising the work of such organs.

In addition to having over-all responsibility for the secretariat's work, Teng seems the most likely of the secretaries to

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supervise the work of the social affairs (security) department. This conjecture is based simply on the probability that the party leadership would wish to keep a very firm grip on the activity of this department, and the apparent concern of the other secretaries with other central organs. However, Teng could instead supervise the organization department or even the conjectured judicial department. Moreover, the American Consulate General at Hong Kong, in a recent perceptive study of the CCP machine, has suggested that Liu Lan-tao may be the secretariat's supervisor of security work and perhaps concurrently the director of the social affairs department. (Liu is regarded by POLO as more likely to be the director of the conjectured judicial department.) Teng Hsiao-ping made an appearance in July 1958, along with Mao, to greet the delegates to a national conference on public security work, but this is not very helpful in identifying Teng directly with the social affairs department, as part of the work of the Ministry of Public Security comes within the compass of the social affairs department but the remainder comes under the purview of whatever party department supervises the State Council's first staff office.

Peng Chen is thought to share with Teng Hsiao-ping the overall responsibility for the secretariat's work. Peng seems the most likely of the secretaries to supervise the work of the organization department, of which he was the director for some years. Peng also seems the most likely to supervise the work of the united front work department, and thus to be the ultimate supervisor of the State Council's eighth staff office, the Nationalities Commission, and the Overseas Chinese Commission. However, Peng was one of the main speakers at a national conference on judicial work in August, and may instead be concerned with the conjectured judicial department.

Li Fu-chun, the recently added third-ranking secretary, is believed to supervise and concurrently to direct a conjectured planning department, which in turn would direct party work in the five major commissions concerned with planning which are not subordinate to any staff office. These are Li's own State Planning Commission, Po I-po's National Economic Commission, Han Kuang's National Technological Commission, Nieh Jung-chen's Scientific Planning Commission, and Chen Yun's Basic Construction Commission. This last-named body was identified only in October, after POLO-V had gone to press, and therefore does not appear on Chart IX.

Li Hsien-nien, the recently added fourth-ranking secretary, is almost certainly concerned with supervising the work of the Finance and Trade Work Department, which in turn would direct party work in the State Council's fifth staff office (finance, trade, and commerce) and its subordinate ministries. Finance and trade have been Li's field for many years, and he was for some years director of the fifth staff office (Cheng Tzu-hua replaced him in 1957).

Tan Chen-lin, the fifth-ranking secretary, almost certainly supervises the work of the rural work department, which in turn directs party work in the State Council's seventh staff office

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(agriculture and conservation) and presumably in the Soil and Water Conservancy Commission. Tan has apparently been concerned entirely with rural work for the past two years. With Tan, like Teng Hsiao-ping and Peng Chen, regarded as an "organizational" figure, the "organizational" group holds three of the top five spots in the party secretariat.

Wang Chia-hsiang, sixth-ranking secretary, seems the most likely of the secretaries to supervise the work of the liaison department, i.e., the department for liaison with other Communist parties. This department may supervise the activity of the staff office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which seems to be concerned with liaison with important visitors.

Tan Cheng, seventh-ranking secretary, presumably supervises himself as director of the general political department. This department is responsible for political work in the military establishment, operating administratively within the Ministry of National Defense of which Tan is the senior deputy minister.

Huang Ko-cheng, eighth-ranking secretary, does not appear to supervise the work of any central department, but instead to be the secretariat's link with the military work of the Ministry of National Defense, in the same way that Tan Cheng is the link for political work. Huang is much more a military man than other members of the secretariat, is second-ranking (behind Tan Cheng) of the deputy ministers of defense, and appears second in importance only to Peng Te-huai among the active military leaders. Huang's position--and the secretariat's link with military operations--has been strengthened by his just-announced appointment as chief-of-staff.

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Li Hsueh-feng, last-ranking of the full secretaries, is also in the position of supervising himself as director of the industrial work department, and is presumably also the supervisor of the communications work department, which was originally joined with the industrial work department. The industrial work department presumably directs party work in the State Council's third staff office (Po I-po) and its subordinate ministries concerned primarily with heavy industry, and in the fourth staff office (Chia To-fu) concerned primarily with light industry. The communications department presumably directs party work in the sixth staff office (Wang Shou-tao) and its subordinate ministries, concerned with communications and transport. Li is also regarded, with Teng, Peng, and Tan, as an "organizational" figure.

The other three secretaries are alternates. As the secretariat is presumably not a voting body, the reason for the distinction between full and alternate secretaries is not clear. All of the alternates rank higher in the central committee than do two of the full secretaries, so the distinction does not appear to be between relatively senior and relatively junior secretaries.

Liu Lan-tao, the senior of the alternate secretaries, is regarded as another "organizational" figure. Liu may supervise and concurrently direct a conjectured judicial department of the central committee and also supervise the party's central control

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commission, of which he is the senior deputy. The American Consulate General at Hong Kong has observed that judicial departments--known as political and judicial work departments--generally exist at the provincial level and would seem needed at the national level. This department would direct party work in the courts and procuratorates and in the State Council's first staff office and its subordinate Ministries of Public Security, Supervision, Justice, and Interior. Peng Chen is another possibility as both supervisor and director of this department.

Yang Shang-kun, second-ranking of the alternate secretaries, is known to direct the central committee's staff office, which for convenience is treated as a central department. Yang, yet another "organizational" figure, is not believed to supervise the work of any of the true central departments.

Hu Chiao-mu, last-ranking of the three alternates, presumably supervises the work of the propaganda department, of which he is a deputy director. The propaganda department is believed to direct party work in the State Council's second staff office and its subordinate ministries concerned with culture, education, and public health, as well as the Cultural Relations Commission and the Physical Culture Commission. The propaganda department, rather than a conjectured planning department, may also direct party work in the Scientific Planning Commission. There may be, or may emerge, a cultural and educational work department of the central committee, similar to the cultural-educational departments which generally exist now at the provincial level; but at the moment the propaganda department seems to handle this area of concern through separate branches for culture, higher education, science, and so on.

Central Departments

The known central departments of the central committee now total nine, in addition to the staff office. These are: organization, propaganda, social affairs, general political, united front, rural work, industrial work, finance and trade, and communications. A tenth, the liaison department, is virtually certain. Two others, a planning department and a judicial department (whatever their designations), seem very probable. The known central committees (really subcommittees) of the CCP central committee are five: the central control committee (usually called commission), the committee for organs directly subordinate to the central committee, the central state organs committee, the military committee, and the women's work committee. At least three others have been conjectured but are not accepted: a youth work committee, a labor committee, and an economic committee.

The central committee's staff office apparently remains simply an administrative office. Yang Shang-kun continues as director. His two known deputies are Tseng San, an apparent protégé who has also been subordinate to Yang on one of the central committees, and more recently Li Chieh-po, with a background in labor work.

The organization department in recent years has almost certainly given up certain of its functions to the secretariat and

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some of the other central departments and committees, but is still of importance in party personnel matters below the top level. Au Tzu-wen, another "organizational" figure, presumably continues as director of this department, although he has not been recently identified in the post. Ma Ming-fang has probably left the organization department to direct the finance and trade work department. Shuai Meng-chi (female) was still a deputy director of the organization department in mid-1958.

The propaganda department appears to be dominated by persons closely associated with Mao Tse-tung, but has shown increasingly the hand of Teng Hsiao-ping. Lu Ting-i, very active on Mao's behalf in the past two years, was still the director of this department in mid-1958. Chen Po-ta and Hu Chiao-mu, long spokesmen for Mao, have not been identified as deputy directors in 1958 but are believed to retain the posts. Chou Yang, another Mao-man, was still a deputy director in mid-1958. Chang Chi-chun and Chang Tzu-i, both onetime lieutenants of Teng Hsiao-ping in the Southwest and more recently deputy directors of this department, apparently remain so. Chang Pan-shih, who was associated with Teng in North China during and after World War II, has been identified as a deputy director in 1958. Also appearing as a deputy director in 1958 is Hu Sheng, a theorist who for some years had held a lesser post in this department.

The social affairs (security) department remains the most shadowy of the central departments. It is believed to have still the functions of investigating the loyalty and security of party members, and to direct some part of the regime's intelligence, counterintelligence, and public security activities. As noted above, Teng Hsiao-ping is regarded as the likely supervisor of this department, and might be its actual director. Liu Lan-tao and Huang Ko-cheng are other members of the secretariat who have been suggested as both supervisor and director of this department. Kang Sheng seems to have left the fields of security and intelligence. Lo Jui-ching might conceivably direct the social affairs department concurrently with his post as minister of public security, but it is questionable whether he is a sufficiently able man for the job. Li Ko-nung, the last known director of the social affairs department, may have resumed the post, and would probably prove to be the leading suspect if observers of the China scene were polled. However, there is nothing solid as to the identity of any officer of this department. ILLEGIB

The general political department continues to be dominated by protégés of Mao and/or Lo Jung-huan, who in recent years have been careful to associate themselves and their work directly with Mao. Tan Cheng, the director, and Hsiao Hua and Kan Szu-chi, the two known deputy directors prior to this year, have not been identified in these posts during 1958 but have made appearances indicating that they still hold them. A third deputy, Liu Chih-chien, who was associated with Teng Hsiao-ping during World War II and has been with the general political department for several years, has been identified in 1958.

The united front work department remains active in managing the party's complex relationships with the puppet parties, nonparty

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figures, minority nationalities, overseas Chinese, the remaining "capitalists," and so on. Li Wei-han, the director, is regarded as closer to Chou En-lai than to other party leaders. The most important figure among the deputy directors, Liao Cheng-chih, has not been identified in the post for more than two years. Another deputy director, Liu Ko-ping, has apparently been transferred to Ninghsia. The other six deputy directors have been identified as still holding this post in 1958.

The rural work department is still directed by Teng Tzu-hui, although Teng's position has deteriorated as Tan Chen-lin's has been enhanced in the entire field of rural work. Chen Po-ta has apparently left the rural work department. Teng's only two known deputies in this department are his concurrent deputies in the State Council's seventh staff office, Liao Lu-yen and Chen Cheng-jen. Liao's various pronouncements of the past year have suggested that he may be seeking to displace Teng.

The industrial work department continues to direct the work of party committees--defining "principles and policies" and checking results--in state-owned industrial enterprises. This department may have branches for heavy, light, and local industry. Li Hsueh-feng, regarded as an "organizational" figure, appears to be still the director of this department. His only known deputy has been Li Li-san, not identified in the post since early 1957.

The communications work department presumably continues its parallel work in the field of communications, replacing the earlier political departments in the Ministries (all subordinate to the State Council's sixth staff office) of Railways, Communications, and Posts and Telecommunications. Tseng Shan has been identified in 1958 as still the director of this department. Chang Pang-ying, a party secretary from the Northwest, has first been identified in 1958 as a deputy director.

The finance and trade work department appeared only in mid-1958, although such a department had existed at the provincial level for some years. Its concern, parallel to that of the industrial and communications departments, is presumably with party committees in financial and trade organs. Ma Ming-fang, previously deputy director of the organization department and regarded as an "organizational" figure, is director of the new department. Pei Meng-fei, who had been associated in Central-South China with several party leaders now in the secretariat and central departments, has reportedly appeared as deputy director.

The liaison department has been increasingly active, although never expressly identified, in handling foreign Communist visitors. It is presumed also to dispatch Chinese Communist representatives (below the top level) to international Communist occasions. Wang Chia-hsiang is the most likely candidate as director as well as supervisor of this department; he seemed to play this role in the Khrushchev-Mao talks last summer. Liu Ning-i, Chao I-min, and several others are possible deputy directors.

As noted above, a planning department directing party work in the regime's major planning commissions, and a judicial department

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directing party work in judicial and public security and related organs, are thought probable but have not been identified. Li Fu-chun is thought to direct as well as to supervise the planning department, while Peng Chen, Liu Lan-tao, and Lin Feng are among the possible directors of the judicial department. Peiping may soon identify these departments and their officers.

Other Central Organs

The central control commission apparently continues to differ somewhat in status from either the departments or the committees (and is thus designated as a commission rather than a committee, although the Chinese use one word for both). As a party disciplinary organ operating at all levels, it works under the direction of party committees of those levels; even the central control commission must follow the central committee's lead. Tung Pi-wu is still the secretary of this commission. Liu Lan-tao of the secretariat and Hsiao Hua of the general political department are still among his deputies.

The various central committees subordinate to the CCP central committee seem to differ in character from the central departments. Whereas the departments are standing bodies concerned with the daily task of directing the work of party organs (including party organs in government bodies), all of the committees seem to be ad hoc bodies convened irregularly with the comparatively unimportant function of enunciating central committee policy decisions to the personnel of central party organs, party committees in central government organs, party committees in the military establishment, officers of mass organizations, and so on.

The committee for organs directly subordinate to the central committee has met for such purposes as transmitting to central party organs a central committee directive on "rectification" and (later) summarizing "experience" in rectification. Yang Shang-kun of the secretariat was the secretary of this committee as of December 1957, when a new slate of officers was elected; none has been identified.

The committee for central state organs has met for similar purposes, such as examining party organs attached to government organs on their ways of studying Mao's theses on "contradictions" and "deciding" to undertake rectification of government organs through the party organs attached to them. The secretary of this committee as of mid-1958 was Kung Tzu-jung, a little-known party worker who is not a member of the CCP central committee but in recent months has made appearances with party leaders.

The military committee reappeared in early 1958, being credited with a decision in spring 1957 to merge the propaganda and cultural branches of the general political department. This particular "decision" was probably an announcement of a decision made elsewhere.

the military committee was as of 1957 an ad hoc body convened for important announcements on policies and personnel actions. The military committee appeared in this latter character in the early summer of 1958, holding an enlarged conference which

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reviewed the development of the armed forces, "decided on" principles for the future, and adopted (i.e., approved) national defense policies. Almost all of the regime's marshals spoke at that conference. Peng Te-huai summarized the discussion, which may mean that he is the secretary of the military committee.

The only other committee known to exist, the women's work committee, has not appeared in the news since the eighth party congress in the fall of 1956. However, the two ranking officers of that committee, Tsai Chang (Mrs. Li Fu-chun) and Teng Ying-chao (Mrs. Chou En-lai) have made several appearances to discuss women's work. Women's work for the most part is carried on through the Women's Federation, the headquarters of which is in effect a minor department of the CCP central committee. This being so, the Women's Federation may in effect have absorbed the women's work committee, as Tsai and Teng are respectively the chairman and deputy chairman of the federation.

The continued existence of a youth work committee has been surmised by some observers. If it exists, it may be in much the position of the women's work committee. The Young Communist League, like the Women's Federation, is in effect a minor department of the CCP central committee, and the most important youth work is carried on through the league. Hu Yao-pang, another "organizational" figure, is first secretary of the league and the likeliest candidate as secretary of any youth work committee.

The resurrection of a labor committee has also been surmised by some observers. If it exists, it may be in much the position of the women's work committee and any youth work committee. That labor work which is not carried on through certain of the major economic departments of the central committee is handled mainly through the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), which, like the Women's Federation and the Young Communist League, is in effect a minor department of the CCP central committee. Liu Ning-i, who has been closely associated with "organizational" leaders, was named chairman of the ACFTU in August 1958 after the death of Lai Jo-yu, and might be the secretary of any labor committee.

The existence of an economic committee has been surmised by some observers. There is no apparent need for such a committee, as the area of its conjectured concern would seem already filled by various features of the work of several of the central departments and committees. However, this might also be said of the military committee, the women's committee, and the possible youth and labor committees; so yet another economic body may emerge, concerned simply with enunciating economic policies.

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